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FEE SHIFTING IN BANKRUPTCY: DETERRING

FRIVOLOUS, FRAUD-BASED OBJECTIONS TO
DISCHARGE
NATHALiE D. MARTIN

One of the primary purposes of Chapter 7 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code is to discharge debtors from most prebankruptcy debts and thereby to provide those debtors with a
fresh start financially. In this Article, Professor Nathalie D.
Martin examines how creditorscan abuse one section of Chapter
7 to undermine the fresh start policy. Section 727(a)(4) of the
Code denies a general discharge to debtors who make false
statements in their bankruptcypetitions. Making a false statement
also is a crime that can result in imprisonment. There is, however,
no provision in the Bankruptcy Code that sanctions a creditorfor
alleging without proof that the debtor has made a false statement,
even if a court determines that the creditor'sobjection is meritless.
Because most bankruptcy petitions and schedules contain some
clerical errors and because debtors rarely can afford to defend
against major litigation, a creditor need only threaten a suit or
bring a baseless action in order to coerce the debtor into paying an
otherwise dischargeable debt. Without a sufficient sanction for
filing a frivolous objection to a debtor's general discharge,
creditorsare essentiallyfree to abuse § 727. In order to deter such
abuse, ProfessorMartin suggests that Congress amend this section
of the Bankruptcy Code. ProfessorMartin'sproposed change to
§ 727 would require that a creditorpay certain fees if it files an
objection to discharge but is subsequently unable to produce
evidence sufficient to reach a trial on the merits. The proposed
amendment also would give courts the discretion to impose
sanctions even after trial where such sanctions are warranted.
Pending amendment of the Code, this Article recommends that
courts use Bankruptcy Rule 9011 to sanction creditor behavior
* Abraham L. Freedman Fellow, Temple University School of Law. B.A., St. Olaf
College; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law; LL.M., Temple University (pending).
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the gap between the haves and the have-nots continues to
widen, more and more situations arise in which to challenge the
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American rule with respect to counsel fees.1 After all, litigation is a

rich person's game, and those without liquid assets are frequently
This is particularly true when
unable to defend themselves.
individuals are sued by institutions. Expecting even a well-heeled
individual to litigate with institutions is like expecting one to fight

rifle fire with bows and arrows.2 And, as scholars have recognized,
repeat offenders in the litigation game can spread their costs over
more transactions, and even fight battles that are not cost-effective,
in order to make law that is favorable to them and others like them.3
Economic power could hardly be more unevenly distributed
between the parties than in litigation arising in individual4 bankruptcy
cases, where primarily institutional' creditors spar with people
already down on their economic luck. As an example of the type of
abusive litigation that occurs in bankruptcy, this Article focuses on
frivolous objections to a debtor's general bankruptcy discharge.
For most people, bankruptcy is not free.6 Thus, ironically, many
individuals are so broke they cannot afford to file for bankruptcy. In

1. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95,124-25 (1974).
2. Cf. Pisano v. Verdon (In re Verdon), 95 B.R. 877, 886 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)
(noting that creditors often have deep pockets, but consumer debtors are penurious).
3. See William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf
Between Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts in the U.C.C., 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243,
261 (1997).
4. This Article discusses the bankruptcy discharge provided to individuals who file a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 727
(1994). Corporations that file Chapter 7 cases do not receive a discharge and thus are not
affected by the issues discussed in this Article. Under Chapter 7, corporations and
individuals sell all non-exempt assets to satisfy creditors. For a general discussion of
Chapter 7, see D. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 9-11 (1993). For a comparison of this
chapter to other types of bankruptcy, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF
BANKRUPTCY

4-27 (1992).

5. While not all creditors are institutional, many of the most active creditors are.
See In re United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 10 B.R. 312, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that
institutional creditors accounted for a vast majority of the debt in the case), rev'd, 674
F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Rivers End Apartments, Ltd., 167 B.R. 470, 479 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting that most secured creditors are institutional creditors).
Consequently, the hypotheticals used herein involve institutional rather than individual
creditors.
6. For some people, Chapter 7 bankruptcies are free. For example, the Consumer
Bankruptcy Assistance Project ("CBAP") in Philadelphia provides free legal assistance,
through trained volunteers, to persons who meet certain income guidelines. See Susan
Block-Lieb, A Comparison of Pro Bono RepresentationProgramsfor Consumer Debtors,
2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 37,47 (1994). Hundreds of Chapter 7 cases have been filed
by CBAP in its six years of existence. See id. CBAP is considered one of the most
successful of its kind. See id. at 42-51 (describing the business of CBAP and seven other
providers of pro bono bankruptcy services).
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fact, many low income people cannot even afford a successful
Chapter 7 case,7 the bankruptcy of choice for people with few assets.'
The inability to afford bankruptcy results not from the high cost of a
debtor's attorney's fees for filing the bankruptcy petition, but from
the cost of defending creditor-initiated litigation in these cases,9 much
of which is meritless and filed for leverage purposes only.0 Debtors
11
with few assets are no match for creditors with unlimited resources,1 2
and in a no asset case, in which valuation disputes are uncommon,
the biggest threat to a debtor's case is an objection to his bankruptcy
discharge. 3
A creditor can file an objection to discharge at very little cost.
The mere filing of such an objection, regardless of its merits, can
deny a debtor a general discharge for months, even years, 14 in
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766.
8. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522, people who file for bankruptcy may exempt, and thus
keep, certain assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 522. In many states, state law exemptions may be
chosen instead of the federal exemptions described in § 522. See id. § 522(d) (describing
the federal exemptions); id. § 522(b)(2)(A) (stating that one may choose the federal
exemptions or any others provided by state law). People whose assets do not exceed
those that can be retained under the applicable exemptions, and without a salary greatly
in excess of their expenses, see id. § 707(b), would most certainly file a Chapter 7. Unlike
a Chapter 13, such a person may discharge most outstanding debts under § 727 rather
than paying off a portion of them under Chapter 13. See id. § 1301.
9. Interview with Hon. Gloria M. Bums, United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey, in Camden, NJ. (Sept. 23, 1997).
10. In the District of New Jersey, a case involving an objection to discharge that
never went to trial cost joint debtors over $15,000. See id.
11. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 99-100.
12. Extensive litigation occurs in valuing a debtors' assets for the purpose of
determining which assets are subject to distribution to creditors. Debtors and trustees
frequently disagree about the value of certain assets, resulting in extensive valuation
hearings. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 227 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6186 (recognizing that valuation hearings were costly and time-consuming).
13. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Arcuri (In re Arcuri), 116 B.R. 873, 878 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that no issue is more central to an individual debtor's bankruptcy case than
discharge).
14. Once a case is filed, it may take many months, and sometimes even years, to
adjudicate, during which time the debtor is in limbo. In one case, the initial valuation
hearings took six months and the court took an additional 12 months to render its final
decision. See In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331,347 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984). Another case in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was pending for over nine months. Interview with
Hon. David A. Scholl, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Sept. 17, 1997). Moreover, many creditors
will lend to a debtor after a bankruptcy, as long as the prior debts are discharged. The
debtor is then considered a safe risk because the old debts are gone and the debtor cannot
file another bankruptcy for six years. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (1994). During the entire
time a particular case is pending, however, the debtor is unlikely to be able to obtain
credit because the prior debts are not discharged. In the meantime, the debtor is unable
to move on to a new psychological chapter in life.
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complete derogation of one of the principal purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code.15 The creditor's goal in doing so, however, is not
necessarily to deny the debtor's discharge; rather, the goal frequently
is to force the debtor to agree to pay her otherwise dischargeable
debt to the creditor, a goal that is completely forbidden by the
Bankruptcy Code.
Discharge, which relieves a debtor from most pre-petition debts,
is the ultimate goal of the individual Chapter 7 case.' The discharge
is the very foundation of the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy
and is accompanied by a complex system of back-up protections
designed to ensure that the fresh start obtained in bankruptcy is real
and not illusory."8
These mechanisms, however, do not fully protect the individual
bankruptcy discharge. Creditor abuses in the objection process

15. Aptly described as a "cornerstone" of the debtor's economic rehabilitation, see

Scholtz v. Shapiro (In re Shapiro), 59 B.R. 844,847 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986), the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code represent the "foremost remedy to effectuate the
'fresh start' which is the goal of bankruptcy relief to the debtor," Ray v. Graham (In re
Graham), 111 B.R. 801, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990); see also Dilworth v. Boothe (In re
Dilworth), 69 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1934) (noting that discharge of debt is "[o]ne of the

great objects of the bankruptcy law"); G & G Cards & Gifts, Inc. v. Berman (In re
Berman), 100 B.R. 640,644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The granting to a debtor of a 'fresh
start' is the quintessence of the bankruptcy code and the litmus against which any
argument impacting discharge must be compared in determining compliance with
congressional intent."). Through discharge, as the Supreme Court has observed, a debtor
gains a "'new opportunity in life and a clear field in future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.'" Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19
(1970) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244-45 (1934)).
16. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362,727.
17. See Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
18. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text (describing the various bankruptcy
provisions that accompany and complement bankruptcy discharge).
Given the
importance of the fresh start policy under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual's discharge
is to be freely granted, and the exceptions and objections to discharge are to be
interpreted narrowly in favor of the debtor and against creditors. Exceptions to discharge
under § 523 except certain debts from the debtor's overall discharge, either because of the
type of debt (taxes, alimony, or child support), or because of the debtor's wrongdoing
(extortion, fraud, etc.). See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Thus, under § 523, an objection to
discharge, if successful, denies discharge of a particular debt. See id. Under § 727,
however, an objection to discharge, if successful, denies a debtor's entire discharge, thus
eliminating all the benefits of bankruptcy filing, not just denying the discharge of a
particular debt. See i&. § 727(a). Creditors must produce direct evidence supporting nondischargeability in order to succeed in denying or limiting discharge. Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 4005 states that "[a]t the trial on a complaint objecting to a
discharge, the [objecting creditor] has the burden of proving the objection." FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4005; see also Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322, 324
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that a creditor "bears the burden of establishing that the
Debtor's debt to [the creditor] should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5)").
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continue to deny debtors their financial fresh start, by coercing
debtors to agree to pay back dischargeable debts.19 Congress
anticipated creditor abuses in the area of discharge objections and
provided that in certain of these situations, if a creditor brought an
unsuccessful objection to discharge, the creditor would be charged
with the debtor's attorney's fees.2 The situations in which Congress
chose to allow courts to sanction creditors in this way, however, are
few in number and are not those situations most susceptible to
creditor abuse.2 '
For example, a creditor may object to the discharge of its own
debt only, or to the debtor's entire discharge.' Counsel fees are
imposed when a creditor unsuccessfully challenges discharge of
certain debts.24 Such fees are not imposed in unsuccessful objections
to the debtor's general discharge, however, which pose a far greater
threat to the debtor's overall goal.2' In fact, a creditor can object with
no proof whatsoever to a debtor's general discharge on the ground
that the debtor made a knowing and fraudulent false oath in his
bankruptcy case and not face statutorily imposed fees.26 These
allegations, if true, would constitute bankruptcy fraud and would be
punishable by imprisonment and a fine of up to $5000.' Yet creditors
19. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing potential for abuse by
creditors). This conduct is an example of what I have termed "leverage litigation." For a
discussion of the potential for abuse when creditors file objections to discharge without
considering the grave consequences to the debtor, see American First Credit Union v.
Shaw (In re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291,294 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d); infra note 170 and accompanying text (noting that prior to

the enactment of § 523(d), bankruptcy courts were not authorized to award fees unless a
party acted in bad faith).
21. Such fees are statutorily imposed when a creditor files an unsuccessful objection
to the discharge of particular consumer debts under § 523(a), which denies
dischargeability because of fraudulent or misrepresentative statements made to a creditor

by the debtor pre-petition. See id. § 523(d). Fees are not imposed for similar allegations
contained in an objection to a debtor's overall discharge. Compare id. (authorizing courts
to award attorney fees), with id. § 727 (providing no authorization for courts to award
such fees).
22. See id.§ 523(a).
23. See id.§ 727.

24. See id.
§ 523(d).
25. See id. § 727; see also infra note 127 and accompanying text (comparing § 727 and
§ 523).
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (providing for denial of discharge on various grounds but
imposing no sanctions for frivolous objections).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994). The United States Code provides that "a person
who knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any
case under Title 11 ...shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both." Id. In order to be found guilty of a bankruptcy crime, a separate criminal
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are free to allege such crimes, without proof, at no economic risk
under existing law
The benefits to a creditor of making even
entirely false allegations of bankruptcy fraud far outweigh the risks.
With no resources with which to challenge the allegations and a
looming, albeit slight, possibility of imprisonment, a debtor is
frequently motivated to pay the objecting creditor's debt, even if she
has done nothing wrong.
This Article proposes an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to
eliminate inconsistencies within the Code between the sanctions
imposed for improper allegations of pre-petition fraud in 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 and post-petition fraud in 11 U.S.C. § 727. This much needed
amendment will punish and deter the most harmful forms of creditor
abuse in the area of discharge litigation. Section II of this Article
contains a hypothetical example of the type of abuse that occurs in
discharge litigation, in order to put the problem in perspective'
Section III reviews the history of and policy considerations
underlying a debtor's general bankruptcy discharge," and Section IV
describes the fresh start scheme supporting the debtor's discharge.3'
Section V compares the various limitations upon discharge contained
in the Bankruptcy Code and identifies inconsistencies in the ways in
which improper behavior of varying degrees is treated under the
Code. 2 Section VI discusses various proposed amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code that would impose fees against creditors who
improperly object to discharge under § 727(a)(4).'
This section
ultimately proposes that the Bankruptcy Code be amended in two
ways: (1) to require the imposition of sanctions in all cases in which
the creditor is unable to produce evidence sufficient to reach a trial
on the merits; and (2) to permit judges to impose sanctions in cases
that do reach trial, when the circumstances justify such a result.
Section VII compares the proposed amendment to Bankruptcy Rule
9011, concluding that existing Rule 9011 is insufficient to remedy the
problem of abusive credit actions under § 727(a)(4), but that it should
proceeding must be instituted. See id. After proving the false oath in a prior proceeding,
however, obtaining a conviction in the subsequent criminal proceeding would not be
difficult.

28. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (imposing sanctions for unsuccessful dischargeability
actions), with id. § 727(a) (imposing no sanctions for unsuccessful objections to
discharge).
29. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.

30. See infra notes 50-99 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 115-218 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 219-39 and accompanying text.
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be used, both by debtors' counsel and by courts sua sponte, to
address improprieties pending amendment of the Bankruptcy Code:"
Ultimately, the Article concludes that a failure to impose sanctions in
cases involving frivolous objections to discharge effectively denies a
discharge to a debtor who cannot afford to pay an attorney to litigate
about his or her general discharge, thus depriving the most needy of
the very linchpin of bankruptcy benefits.35
II. AN EXAMPLE OF AN IMPROPER OBJECTION TO A DEBTOR'S

GENERAL DISCHARGE
In order to fully understand the problem addressed in the
Article, consider the following example.'
Mr. and Mrs. Brown buy a home in San Francisco in 1990 that is
affordable on their San Francisco salaries. Then the primary
breadwinner loses her job and the couple relocates to Athens,
Georgia. The San Francisco home is sold at a $100,000 loss, leaving a
California bank with a $100,000 unsecured deficiency claim. The
Browns apply for a new loan in Athens in 1994. The mortgage
application asks whether there are any judgments against the Browns
and, given that the California bank's claim has not been reduced to
judgment and there are no other judgments, they respond "no."
When asked about the value of their personal property, the Browns
are unsure. They are informed by the mortgage broker, who fills out
the application and has them sign it, that it is customary to value
personal property at 30% of the total amount of the mortgage. Since
the mortgage in Athens is $150,000, the personal property is valued at

34. See infra notes 240-68 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text; see also Thomas H. Jackson, The
Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985) (discussing
the importance of the bankruptcy discharge in providing a fresh start).
36. This example is based roughly on a case from my own private practice in which
the debtors spent over $12,000 to defend against similar creditor complaints, neither of
which survived motions for summary judgment. During this time, the creditors made
endless attempts to settle the cases. Other attorneys who have represented Chapter 7
debtors have described similar scenarios and, without naming each individual attorney
with whom I have spoken, I wish to thank those who took the time to discuss this problem
with me. While some courts have witnessed and acknowledged the great leverage that
creditors have over debtors in these situations, as well as the corresponding potential for
abuse, see American First Credit Union v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291, 294, 297
(Bankr. D. Utah 1990); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Mayo (In re Mayo), 94 B.R. 315, 329
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1988); In re Burkhardt, 91 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988), in the
vast majority of these situations the courts never see the abuse. The cases are settled
without judicial involvement, which makes the problem insidious and hidden from all but
the attorneys and clients who experience it firsthand.
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$45,000.
When the California bank begins the process of transferring its
deficiency claim to Georgia in 1996, the Browns file a bankruptcy
petition. The personal property is valued at $10,000 based upon the
Browns' lawyer's recommendation that personal property be valued
at forced sale prices. After taking a Rule 2004 examination of the
Browns, the California bank objects to the Browns' general discharge
on the basis of a knowing and fraudulent false oath under
§ 727(a)(4)' because: (1) the Browns failed to disclose the Georgia
credit application as a financial statement given in the past two years
as required by statement of affairs question 17(b);39 and (2) the
Browns undervalued their personal property on their bankruptcy
petition, based solely upon the value used in the Georgia credit
application.
The California bank, who had served discovery on the Georgia
bank, sent the Georgia bank a thank-you note as well as a courtesy
37. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004. Bankruptcy Rule 2004 provides:
(a) Examination on Motion. On motion of any party in interest, the court may
order the examination of any entity.
(b) Scope of Examination. The examination of an entity under this rule or of the
debtor under § 343 of the Code may relate only to the acts, conduct, or property
or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which
may affect the administration of the debtor's estate, or to the debtor's right to a
discharge. In a family farmer's debt adjustment case under chapter 12, an
individual's debt adjustment case under chapter 13, or a reorganization case
urder chapter 11 of the Code, other than for the reorganization of a railroad, the
examination may also relate to the operation of any business and the desirability
of its continuance, the source of any money or property acquired or to be
acquired by the debtor for purposes of consummating a plan and the
consideration given or offered therefor, and any other matter relevant to the
case or to the formulation of a plan.
(c) Compelling Attendance and Production of Documentary Evidence. The
attendance of an entity for examination and the production of documentary
evidence may be compelled in the manner provided in Rule 9016 for the
attendance of witnesses at a hearing or trial.
Id.
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (1994). Under this section, a debtor may be required to
pay all of his or her debts, rather than have them discharged, if the debtor knowingly and
fraudulently makes a false oath or statement in or in connection with his or her
bankruptcy case. See id.
39. See 2 LAWRENCE P. KING, BANKRUPTCY RULES F-59 (Collier pamphlet ed.
1997). Every debtor must complete and submit to the court a long series of disclosure
documents called the "schedules of assets and liabilities" and the "statement of affairs."
11 U.S.C. § 521 (setting forth the debtor's duties). Question 17(b) of the statement of
affairs requires a disclosure of "all firms or individuals who within the two years
immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case have audited the books of
account and records, or prepared a financial statement of the debtor." 2 KING, supra, at
F-59.
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copy of their complaint objecting to the Browns' general discharge.
Having been thus far unaware of the California bank's deficiency
claim, and facing the deadline, the Georgia bank copies the
California bank's complaint and adds an additional ground for denial
of discharge under § 727(a)(4), ° namely that the Browns' general
discharge should be denied because the Browns failed to disclose the
California claim as a judgment on the Georgia credit application.
The Georgia bank's counsel advises against filing an objection to the
discharge of its particular debt under § 523(a)(2)(B) 4' because a
provision in § 523(d) requires an creditor bringing an unsuccessful
suit under this provision to pay the debtor's attorney's fees to defend
the action.42 Instead, counsel advises the bank to file a complaint
under § 727. If the complaint turns out to be baseless, the bank may
withdraw it later at no cost. Since the debtors face the possibility of
imprisonment for a violation of § 727(a)(4),43 the Georgia bank may
be able to get the debtors to agree to a reaffirmation of their whole
debt, despite a severe downturn in the market and a partially
unsecured claim.
Scenario 1 (The Debtors with Liquid Assets):
After the Browns expend thousands of dollars in attorney fees to
conduct discovery, to brief the issues, and to file and argue a
summary judgment motion, both creditors' cases are dismissed
because, according to the court, it is crystal clear that § 727(a)(4)
requires that the alleged false oath occur in the case, not two years
earlier.44 Moreover, statement of affairs question 17(b) does not
appear to require disclosure of a mortgage application, which is ]fot a
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4).
41. See id. § 523(a)(2)(B) (providing that the debt of a particular creditor can be
excepted from discharge if the debtor obtains the credit through pre-petition fraud).

42. See id. § 523(d) (providing that if the creditor brings an action under
§ 523(a)(2)(B) that is ultimately unsuccessful, the creditor may be required to pay the
debtor's attorney's fees in defending the action).

43. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (providing that making a knowing or fraudulent false
oath in or in relation to a bankruptcy case is punishable by a fine of up to $5000 and
imprisonment of up to five years).
44. If there is a discrepancy between an asset value provided on the debtor's
schedules and the value provided at a previous time, the creditor must prove that the false

statement took place in the bankruptcy. See Wines v. Wines (In re Wines), 997 F.2d 852,
855 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sumpter (In re Sumpter), 136 B.R. 690,700 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1991), affd, 170 B.R. 908 (E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, 64
F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1673 (1996). Prior false statements do not

count. The only way to prove that the false statement took place in the case and not prior
thereto is to prove that the assets are worth more than the scheduled value. See infra
note 144 and accompanying text (discussing undervaluation of assets by debtors on
schedules).
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financial statement.
Scenario 2 (The Debtors without Liquid Assets):
Before the discharge complaints were filed, the Browns had paid
their lawyer as much as they could afford. After the discharge
complaints were filed, the Browns' lawyer explained that a judgment
against them under § 727(a)(4) could actually result in a jail term and
that given the stakes and the fact that the creditors were lodging
extensive and costly opposition, she needed another $5000 in retainer
funds. The debtors did not have it. Fearful of losses of all kinds, they
reaffirm the entire Georgia bank debt and agree to pay $50,000 of the
$100,000 California bank debt over five years. Although the debtors
know they did not intentionally lie or misrepresent anything, they
believe they have no choice.
Unfortunately, the hypothetical experiences described above are
consistent with reality. As one court noted:
Filing a nondischargeability action sounding in fraud should
never be a routine matter. It requires competent factual
and legal analysis by both the plaintiff and its counsel. It
would not be undertaken without consideration of the
consequences to the debtor, to the creditor, or to the
attorney signing the pleading. To use such a filing to
"shakedown" an honest debtor who is unable to fund a
defense is reprehensible.45
Although courts consistently have recognized that denial of a
debtor's general discharge is a far more drastic and serious remedy
than the mere exception of a particular debt from discharge even if
a creditor has no intention of ever proving a thing, bringing a legally
untenable complaint under §727(a)(4) is tolerated under the current
statutory scheme. '7
To make matters worse, in the above scenarios, the lawyers for
both creditors either failed to read the statute upon which their
complaints were based or saw no risk in bringing meritless suits.,
Under the first scenario, the frivolous suits cost the two bank clients
some money with no return, but at least their lawyers were paid.48
45. American First Credit Union v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291, 297 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1990).
46. See, e.g., Rosen v. Benzer, 996 F.2d 1527, 1531 (3d Cir. 1993); Pyramid Tech.
Corp. v. Cook (In re Cook), 146 B.R. 934, 935 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Shaw, 114
B.R. at 291; Chittenden Trust Co. v. Mayo (In re Mayo), 94 B.R. 315, 329 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1988).
47. See § 727(a) (imposing no sanctions for unsuccessful objections to discharge).

48. The bank's lawyer has an obvious conflict of interest.

The lawyer is paid

regardless of the outcome. The lawyer can always tell her bank client that the discharge
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Under the second scenario, the result was far better for the creditors.
They were able to use their superior economic position and
bargaining power to produce a result that is entirely at odds with the
fresh start principles of the Bankruptcy Code. Unfortunately, the
fewer liquid assets that a particular debtor owns, the more likely that
the second scenario will result, leaving creditors happy and
overcompensated and failing to aid the debtor who needs help the
most.
While this type of litigation, which I call "leverage litigation," is
tacitly tolerated under the current Bankruptcy Code, the Code
imposes fees for unsuccessful objections to the discharge of a
particular debt.49 There is no reason for this inconsistency. Given the
relative stakes in each type of action, attorney fees should also be
statutorily imposed in unsuccessful objections to a debtor's overall
discharge.
Ill. THE HISTORY OF AND PoLICIES BEHIND THE GENERAL
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE

An individual who discloses all information required in his
petition, schedules of assets and liabilities, and statement of financial
affairs,' and who turns over any non-exempt assets to the Chapter 7
trustee so the assets may be sold and the proceeds distributed to
creditors,5' is entitled to a "fresh start"-a chance to start a new
financial life without the burden of the pre-filing debts." Obtaining a
discharge is the raison d'etre of nearly every individual bankruptcy
filing, particularly for a debtor with few assets and little income in
was worth fighting as a matter of principle. Furthermore, as Professor Galanter has
observed, institutions like banks can use economics of scale in order to achieve long-term
gains in litigation. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 98. Regardless of the results in a
particular case, institutions can spread their losses over more cases, and even engage in
economically inefficient litigation in order to affect changes in the law. See id. at 101.
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1994).
50. See id. § 521(1).
51. See id. § 521(4).
52. See id. § 727(a). The primary vehicle through which the "fresh start" is achieved
is the discharge granted under § 727(a), which discharges the debtor from all debts that
arose prior to the date of the order for relief issued by a bankruptcy court, see id., thus
relieving the debtor of all responsibilities to pay back those debts, see id. § 727(b).
Technically, a discharge is a court order declaring that a person is entitled to immunity
from any action by creditors to collect debts existing on the date the bankruptcy was filed.
See Judith R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor
Claims in CorporateReorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEVS. J. 485, 487 (1993). Individuals
receive a discharge as long as they do not trigger any of the grounds for denial of a
discharge contained in § 727(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
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excess of his living expenses. 3
A. Bankruptcy Under Early EnglishLaw
People who could not pay their debts have not always had the
option of walking away from them. English debtors were subjected
to torture, 54 imprisonment 5 and at times even death. 6 In the
sixteenth century, English creditors were permitted to pursue their
claims collectively against merchant debtors' in response to a
debtor's "acts of bankruptcy.5 8 These "acts" related not to the
debtor's financial condition but to his behavior, such as abandoning
his business and moving away. Creditors could then appoint a
commission and collect and sell the debtor's assets.' If creditors
were not paid in full through this process, however, each creditor
53. See BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL
3.01, at 3-2 to -3 (4th ed. 1996); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 6, at 37 (discussing pro
bono representations of consumer debtors).
54. See Ian P.H. Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283,
284-86 (1980). Professors Baird and Jackson have noted that from the debtor's
perspective, the early English laws were viciously punitive. See DOUGLAS BAIRD &
THOMAS JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 27-28 (2d ed.

1990).
55. See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the
Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 154-55 (1982). "The
common law writs of capias authorized 'body execution,' i.e., seizure of the body, held
until payment of the debt." Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in
the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5,7 (1995).
56. See MAX FARRAND,THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at

489 (1966); Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause,1 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 215,217 n.9 (1957).
57. As commerce expanded, the need for a collective procedure to collect debts
became evident. In 1542, during the reign of Henry VIII, the first bankruptcy law was
passed in England. See An Act Against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupts, 34 & 35
Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542) (Eng.). "This law viewed debtors as quasi-criminals and placed
additional remedies in the hands of creditors." Tabb, supranote 55, at 7.
58. The ground for commencing a bankruptcy proceeding by the creditor was the
commission of an "act of bankruptcy" by the debtor, which indicated that the debtor was
attempting to prevent creditors from recovering on debts justly owed them. See Israel
Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52
HARV. L. REV. 189, 193-94 (1938). For example, one act of bankruptcy was "keeping
house," whereby the debtor would confine himself to his home, away from the reach of
creditors. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 8. These "acts" related not to a debtor's financial
condition but to his resulting behavior, such as abandoning his business and moving away.
For a further discussion of acts of bankruptcy, see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *477-79. In response to this behavior to escape paying debts, creditors
could petition for the appointment of a commission to collect and sell the debtor's assets
and distribute them to creditors. See Smith v. Mills, 76 Eng. Rep. 441,473-74 (K.B. 1584).
59. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 58, at *477-79.
60. See Smith, 76 Eng. Rep. at 473-74.
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retained its right to recover from and levy against the debtor and his
future property." Thus, bankruptcy laws in England were initially
used to achieve the sole objective of improving the likelihood of
collecting creditors' debts."
It was not until the Statute of Anne' was enacted in 1705 that
the concept of discharge was born. Titled "An Act to Prevent Frauds
Frequently Committed by Bankrupts," the statute was an attempt to
remedy problems creditors had in locating debtors' assets by
rewarding debtors who helped with the collection process and
reprimanding those who did not.6 Debtors who cooperated fully
received a limited form of discharge and fifty percent of what was
collected." Those who lied or otherwise failed to cooperate were put
to death." Given the punishment for failing to comply, it is hard to

61. See An Act Against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupts, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4,
§ 6. If creditors were not paid off in full, "then the said creditor or creditors, and every
[one] of them, shall and may have their remedy for the recovery and levying of the
residue of the same debts or duties.., in like manner and form as they should and might
have had before the making of this act." Id.
62. See Treiman, supra note 58, at 193. Parliament periodically amended the
bankruptcy laws, especially in the seventeenth century, to enhance the power of the
bankruptcy commissioners to reach more of the debtor's assets and to increase the
penalties against noncompliant debtors. See An Act for the Further Description of a
Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors Against Such as Shall Become Bankrupts, and for
Inflicting Corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in Some Special Cases, 21 Jam., ch.
19, § 8 (1623) (Eng.). For example, the commissioner was empowered to break into the
debtor's house or shop to seize the debtor's property, thus eliminating the effectiveness of
"keeping house." See idU
63. An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts (Statute of
Anne), 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.).
64. See id. The statute provided that "all, and every person and persons so becoming
bankrupt ... who shall ... in all things conform... shall be discharged from all debts by
him, her, or them due and owing at the time that he, she or they did become bankrupt."
Id. § 7. "[Although] the quasi-criminal nature of bankruptcy remained, the Statute of
Anne first established the roots of a more humanitarian treatment of honest but
unfortunate debtors." Tabb, supra note 55, at 10.
65. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 9 ("A cooperative debtor was granted a monetary
allowance out of the bankruptcy estate, the amount of which depended on the percentage
dividend that was paid to creditors.").
66. The capital punishment provision in the Statute of Anne provided that
uncooperative debtors would "suffer as a felon without the benefit of clergy," the English
terminology for the death penalty. An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by
Bankrupts (Statute of Anne), 4 Anne ch. 17, § 18 (Eng.); see Douglas G. Baird, A World
Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 173, 174 n.6. (noting
that one debtor was executed for failing to respond to a notice to appear before a
bankruptcy commission, despite his claim that he had no knowledge of the notice because
he was in Scotland, and that another debtor was executed for trying to hide some bank
notes from his creditors after being found a bankrupt).
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say whether the discharge itself created any incentive to cooperate.
English law eventually became less barbaric, replacing the threat
of death for nonpayment with impfisonment.8 Debtors' prisons
caused additional problems, however, including burdening the state
with the ongoing expense of maintaining the debtor prisoner and his
family.69 Even after debtors were released from prison, existing debts
were often substantial enough to eliminate any chance of ever
repaying them.
B. The History of and PoliciesBehind Discharge Theory in
American Bankruptcy Jurisprudence
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United
States,7 ' but gives no guidance regarding what these uniform laws
67. A discharge under the Statute of Anne required creditor consent and was not an
automatic entitlement. See An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by
Bankrupts (Statute of Anne), 5 Anne ch. 22, § 2 (1706) (Eng.). The commissioners had to
certify that the debtor had "conformed" to the requirements of the Act, meaning that the
debtor cooperated in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. Further, the discharge would
leave the debtor with no more than five pounds per hundred of the net estate, not to
exceed two hundred pounds. See id. § 7. Thus, the creditor consent provision seriously
undercut any beneficial effect of the discharge.
68. See Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 23 (1267) (Eng.) (authorizing the
detention of a debtor), cited in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 140
(1819); see also Cohen, supra note 55, at 154 (noting that the Statute of Marlbridge was
the first statute to provide for detention of a debtor). The English law realized that
debtors' prisons did not guarantee return of a creditor's money but instead merely
incarcerated debtors in the hope of curbing credit abuse. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230-31 (1966).
69. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 249-52 (1974) (noting that
"the New World as well as the Old [had] to re-evaluate the concept of imprisonment for
debt"). The cost of maintaining debtors in prison was eventually passed off to creditors to
make the weekly support payments. See 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 68, at 597.
70. See COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 250 (noting that both in England and in colonial
America, some debtors "never lifted themselves out of their poverty and lived out their
wretched lives as wards of the public or subsisted on private charity"). The Debtors Act
of 1869 abolished imprisonment for debt and released the remaining debtors. See
Debtors Act, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 62, § 4 (1869) (Eng.). However, the statute retained six
exceptions to the abolition of imprisonment, including imprisonment of petty debtors who
refused to pay and imprisonment of fraudulent debtors. See id. In any case, though,
imprisonment was limited to one year. See id.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have [the] Power to ...
establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."). This clause was added late in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,
after very little debate. See FARRAND, supra note 56, at 447. Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina is generally credited with first drafting the Bankruptcy Clause. See id. Roger
Sherman of Connecticut cast the only vote against the Bankruptcy Clause in the fear that
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should contain.2 Bankruptcy laws in this country were historically
involuntary laws designed to aid creditors in collection efforts." A
separate set of provisions called "insolvency laws" were enacted to
provide debtors with a discharge from debtors' prison if they
voluntarily handed over their property.74 This was not to say that
their debts were discharged;5 to the contrary, creditors who were not
paid in full from the sale of the debtors'
assets could continue to
6
pursue their claims after bankruptcy.
Eventually, after decades of negotiations between debtor and
mercantile (creditor) interests, a series of American bankruptcy acts
were enacted that combined the involuntary elements of bankruptcy
with the voluntary aspects of discharge from prison.' After many
other attempts at successful bankruptcy legislation had failed, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted. The Act of 1898 represented
debtors could be put to death. See Burton Perlman, "A View from the Bench," 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 397,513-14 (1992).
72. The subject of bankruptcy received only passing attention at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. See Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, 33 U.
MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Spring 1989, at 40, 40. However, the framers believed
that bankruptcy deserved federal protection because of varying and discriminatory state
laws. See iL
73. The first of these, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat.
19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248, offered very little help to debtors.
In fact, only creditors could initiate a bankruptcy proceeding, and, although discharge was
available, it was granted only under stringent circumstances. See Tabb, supra note 55, at
14-15. Also, only merchants were eligible debtors under the act. See id.
74. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 18, 2 Stat. at 26 (requiring that a debtor
"fully and truly disclose and discover all his or her effects and estate, real and personal").
The debtor was also required to produce his books and accounts, and transfer all of his
estate, except for exempt property, to the assignees. See id. ch. 19, § 18, 2 Stat. at 27.
75. The discharge was not a matter of right but depended on approval by the
creditors and bankruptcy commissioners. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 346 (1991). Moreover,
creditors were still allowed to bring post-discharge proceedings against the debtor. See id.
at 348. In those areas, the burden of invoking the benefits of the "certificate of
discharge" fell upon the debtor. See id.
76. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 34,2 Stat. at 30-31 (providing that a debtor
could raise the discharge as an affirmative defense if sued on or arrested for any debt).
77. The first federal bankruptcy law existed only from 1800 to 1803 and only
provided relief for a small number of financiers and speculators. See COLEMAN, supra
note 69, at 20. The Act of 1800 failed because of its bias toward mercantile interests over
agriculture and the widespread belief of debtor abuse. See BRANDENBURG ON
BANKRUPTCY § 3, at 5 (W. Oppenheimer ed., 4th ed. 1917). Congress thereafter
attempted to enact national bankruptcy policies through the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch.
9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843), the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517
(repealed 1878), and finally the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898)
(repealed 1978). See Tabb, supra note 75, at 326.
78. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
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a compromise between debtor and creditor interests
and provided for
79
the first time a general discharge of indebtedness.
In the years leading up to the enactment of the Act of 1898, the
need for such a discharge became widely recognized. In a colorful
1864 Congressional debate about whether to provide such a
discharge, Representative Jenckes remarked:
Why should this state of things continue?
Of what
advantage can it be to creditors or to the country that so
many tens of thousands of active men of the country should
be held in thralldom? They bear upon their limbs no visible
chains; they have no masters who will yield them food for
their toil, yet they are in the power of those who may sweep
off their earnings at any time, and in some states may
incarcerate their persons in prison ....

What to them are

the guarantees of the Constitution? Why should they love
the Government and yield it hardy allegiance? Many,
indeed, have gone forth to the war for its support, to lay
their bones upon the battle-fields, ... [only] to return to a

life-long servitude and degradation. The fault is here and
not with them or with the Constitution if they owe it slack
allegiance ....

It rests with Congress alone to say whether

more than a hundred thousand of the most intelligent, most
active, and most patriotic men of the country should have
the opportunity of liberating themselves from their bondage
of debt, and walk free in the exercise of those rights which
the immortal Declaration declares inalienable.'
Thus, while the original philosophy behind granting a discharge
had more to do with improving collection efforts than providing a
fresh start, Congress eventually saw added societal benefits in
granting a fresh start." A person with no hope of achieving any
success in society would be unwilling, or perhaps unable, to express
allegiance to our nation and its safety.'
§§ 101-1330 (1994)).
79. See Tabb, supra note 75, at 325 (noting that while the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841
and 1867 allowed voluntary bankruptcy for debtors other than merchants, the Acts did
not allow voluntary discharge). The 1898 Act removed the requirement of either creditor

consent or minimum dividend as a prerequisite to obtaining a discharge. See id. at 364.
The only checks on discharge that remained were those spelled out by Congress in the
Act. See id.

80. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2638 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes).
81. See Tabb, supra note 75, at 364 (noting that the Act of 1898 recognized for the

first time the overriding public interest in granting a discharge to "honest but
unfortunate" debtors).
82. See id at 364-65 (noting that the social utility theory supporting discharge is that
society as a whole benefits when a debtor is freed from the oppressive weight of debt).
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The discharge and certain related debtor protections provided
some debtor relief.? Through the development of the large-scale
consumer economy inthe 1950s and 60s, however, creditors became
far more savvy about protecting themselves against bad debts."
Demanding liens in personal property, a practice unheard of prior to
that time, became common.' For the first time, creditors obtained
security interests in a debtor's household goods, furnishings, and even
automobiles.'
Having obtained liens even on a debtor's most
necessary personal items, which could be enforced both during and
after bankruptcy, creditors could repossess the items if the debtor did
not pay for them.
Consequently, creditors obtained bargaining
power that far outweighed the value of their collateral."
Additionally, enforcement of the discharge provisions contained
in the Act of 1898, which was the operative statute until 1978, was
virtually impossible. Enforcement of the discharge was left to state
courts, which-due to the bankruptcy courts' loss of jurisdiction over
fully adjudicated bankruptcy cases-could ignore the discharge and
permit creditors to pursue debtors for discharged debts.' Even as
recently as the 1960s, the bankruptcy courts had no ability to enforce
a discharge, providing a major impetus for Congress to grant
exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy courts
83. As Peter Coleman noted in his book about the history of bankruptcy in America:
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 incorporated five fundamental principles. It
relieved all debts, not just ones arising out of contracts entered into after the law
went into effect; it permitted both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy; it
applied to all business corporations, including national banks, but exempted
farmers and wage earners from the involuntary provisions; it protected whatever
property was exempt under state law from attachment; and it provided
procedures by which insolvent debtors could have a grace period in which to
reorganize their affairs or reach compositions with their creditors.
COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 29.
84. See DAVID CAPLOVrrZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN
DEFAULT 4-6 (1974).
85. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED

STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 169 (1973).
86. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestion, 68 YALE L.J. 1459,
1470 n.78 (1959).
87. Although most states provided exemption for at least basic items, blanket liens
were still enforceable against the debtor because they were consensual agreements. See
Richard S. Davis, Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH.U. L. REv. 843,848 (1980).
88. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, at 169.
89. See Doug Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58
N.C. L. REV. 723, 732-33 (1980) (noting that judges allowed creditors to secure
reaffirmation of debt despite the language of the 1898 Act prohibiting creditors from
"instituting or continuing any action or employing any process to collect").
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in the Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978.'o
Many reasons have been espoused for granting an individual
debtor a discharge of indebtedness, including debtor rehabilitation,
preservation of the credit-based economy, providing insurance
against insolvency, and even preservation societal resourcesY A
person who owes a significant amount of his future salary to creditors
may be unmotivated to continue working and making an economic
contribution to society.' It also makes more sense to put the risk of
poor credit decisions on creditors, who presumably are in a better
position to absorb the losses and to determine whether credit should
be issued in the first place.'3 Additionally, when public assistance
programs were more readily available, granting a general bankruptcy
discharge saved public assistance funds by providing an additional
safety net that could keep a person from resorting to public
assistance.' The most compelling of all reasons to grant a discharge
is economic: you cannot get blood from a stone and it is a colossal
waste of societal resources to try.95
Despite many good reasons for granting a bankruptcy discharge,
the existence of this policy remains controversial. 6 The bankruptcy
discharge may increase the overall cost of credit, which is borne by
Moreover, the credit industry
people who pay their debtsY
90. See id. at 727 ("The [1898] Act split jurisdiction ... between federal bankruptcy
courts and state courts with general jurisdiction."). A state court could later review a
federal bankruptcy discharge decision and determine the effect of that discharge,
provided, however, that the state court did not frustrate the discharge. See Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,243 (1934); Rendleman, supranote 89, at 727.
91. See Jackson, supra note 35, at 1404-24; Luther Zeigler, Note, The Fraud
Exception to Dischargein Bankruptcy: A Reappraisal,38 STAN. L. REV. 891,894 (1986).
92. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the DischargeabilityDebate, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 56, 94 (1990)
(noting that the social utility theory on discharge includes the notion that a debtor under
the weight of garnishment has little incentive to work).
93. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Dischargein Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1047, 1067 (1987) (noting the belief held by some that consumer credit is too easy
to get).
94. See Jackson, supra note 35, at 1402 (arguing that a debtor may rely on social
welfare programs in the event of no right of discharge).
95. The financial panics of 1837 and 1851 exemplify the strain on what Professor
Tabb calls the "fabric of society." Tabb, supra note 92, at 94. That is, the existence of a
large class of debtors causes financial hardship on the rest of society. See id.
96. See id. at 97 ("Historical evidence suggests that most people do not want a totally
humanitarian or merciful system that allows all debtors to walk free, no matter what their
moral worthiness."); see also Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of
Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 421 (1973) (arguing that the original rationale for
discharge was to encourage honest people to cooperate with the bankruptcy court).
97. See Tabb, supra note 92, at 96 (noting that many creditors contribute to the debt
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consistently has argued that liberal discharge policies lead to abuse
and that bankruptcy and the resulting discharge are available to
consumers who simply do not need this form of relief.98 Given the
competing interests of the credit industry on the one hand, and
consumers on the other, this debate is likely to continue as long as
society remains credit-based. 99
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S FRESH START SCHEME

Despite disagreements about whether there should be a
discharge policy, the Bankruptcy Code is clear: discharge shall be
liberally granted and any provision to deny or limit a discharge must
be construed strictly in favor of the debtorand against the objecting
creditor."' The creditor has the burden of proof with respect to
discharge and must produce sound, credible evidence justifying the
relief requested."'
In addition to its discharge provisions, the Bankruptcy Code also
contains a complex system of related debtor protections that ensure
that the debtor's fresh start is real and not illusory.'2 A debtor may
problem by encouraging overuse of credit).
98. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective,28 UCLA L. REV. 953,
977 (1981); Howard, supranote 93, at 1069; Jackson, supra note 35, at 1427.
99. See Tabb, supra note 92, at 89-99 (discussing various normative rationales for
granting a bankruptcy discharge as well as arguments against granting such a discharge).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1994). As stated in the Report of the House Judiciary
Committee, "the bill ... enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. When
presented with an objection to discharge, we must be "especially circumspect" in light of
these important considerations. See MacLeod v. Arcuri (In re Arcuri), 116 B.R. 873, 878
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). The court is required to construe the objection strictly against
the objectant and liberally in the debtor's favor. See In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793, 795 (2d
Cir. 1961); Barnett Bank v. Muscatell (In re Muscatell), 113 B.R. 72,73 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990); Ray v. Graham (In re Graham), 111 B.R. 801, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990);
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bernard (In re Bernard), 99 B.R. 563, 569
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); American State Bank v. Montgomery (In re Montgomery), 86
B.R. 948, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Johnson (In re
Johnson), 82 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988); Sinkon v. Latimer (In re Latimer), 82
B.R. 354, 359 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Giel v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 58 B.R. 462, 464
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Switzer (In re Switzer), 55
B.R. 991, 997 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
101. See Ohio Co. v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 162 B.R. 349, 353 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(stating that "[t]he party objecting to the Debtor's discharge has the burden of proving by
a mere preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor's discharge should be denied"). In
addition, the creditor must timely request that the bankruptcy court consider the
nondischargeability of the debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B). Otherwise, the debt will
be discharged. See id.
102. The discharge injunction, as one of these protections, voids all judgments on
discharged debts and bans "an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal
liability of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); see also DAVID T. STANLEY ET AL.,
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now exempt a variety of valuable property under the federal
exemptions, or may opt for the state law exemptions." 3 A debtor also
may avoid certain judgment liens, including liens that interfere with
exempt property, thus modifying creditors' rights in secured
property.'m The debtor also may utilize the trustee's avoiding powers
to recover exempt property 0 5 and can redeem certain consumer
property."' Moreover, government agencies are precluded from
discriminating against a person merely because she has filed for
bankruptcy."7
The automatic stay enjoins the commencement or continuation
of any action to collect a discharged debt. 8 The stay prevents
recovery of the debt from the debtor or his property and operates as
an injunction, whether or not discharge of the debt is waived."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the broad jurisdiction granted
to bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Code.. provides
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 60-62 (1971) (noting that a creditor is
barred from pursuing a debtor.for pre-petition debts after discharge).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994); Veryl Victoria Miles, A Debtor'sRight to Avoid
Liens Against Exempt Property Under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code. Meaningless
or Meaningful?, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 117, 118 (1991). A debtor domiciled in a state that
"opts out" may elect only those exemptions authorized by state law. See Marc S. Cohen
& Kenneth N. Klee, Caveat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Underthe Bankruptcy Code,
58 N.C. L. REV. 681, 688-91 (1980) (noting that typical state law exemptions might allow
a debtor to exempt a variety of property, including limited personal property, various
disability and social security benefits provided by federal law, and, in some states,
property owned as tenants by the entireties).
104. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f), 724(a).
105. See id. § 522(f). The debtor, in effect, stands in the trustee's shoes to recover
property on his own behalf. For example, a debtor may recover exempt property
transferred involuntarily and without bad faith. See id. § 522(g).
106. See id. § 722. This provision allows a debtor to redeem personal tangible property
exempt under § 522. See id. This thwarts the common practice by creditors of taking
security interests in the debtor's household goods, automobile, etc. See Margaret
Howard, Strippingdown Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 373,389 (1991).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 525 (codifying the holding of Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971)). The provision prohibits discrimination with respect to licenses, employment, etc.

See id.
108. See id. § 362(a)(6) (providing the debtor with a "stay," which forbids the creditor
from attempting to "[c]ollect, assess, or recover a [pre-bankruptcy] claim").
109. See id. § 362. This provision in § 522 generally applies to unsecured creditors
only. However, § 522(f) property lies beyond the reach of most unsecured and secured
creditors. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 362 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6318.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). In the 1982 case of Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Supreme Court held bankruptcy
court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1976) unconstitutional because the
Code granted Article M "judicial power" to non-Article III bankruptcy courts. See
Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 87. Congress responded-albeit belatedly-to the Court's
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bankruptcy courts with the absolute ability to enforce the discharge
and related debtor protections."' Taken together, these provisions
shield the debtor from all actions taken by creditors whose debts
have been discharged, absolutely forbid creditors from making any
attempt to collect a pre-petition debt,"' and produce what has been
described as the most extensive debt relief system since the Biblical
seven-year release.'
V. LIMITATIONS ON DISCHARGE

In order to protect against abuses by bankruptcy debtors during
bankruptcy cases, to punish certain pre-petition behavior, and to
protect certain debts from discharge, Congress enacted exceptions to
the general right of discharge." 5 Discharge may be limited in two
ways: either a particular debt may be excepted from discharge," 6 or a
ruling by providing a different form of jurisdiction for bankruptcy courts in the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 151. Under BAFJA, bankruptcy courts act as an arm of the district courts and hear
cases only by reference from the district courts. See id.
111. See Kimberli A. Cary, The Arsenal of Sanctionary Powers at the Bankruptcy
Court's Disposal, 13 BANKR. DEvs. J. 443, 449-50 (1997) (noting that after Northern
Pipeline, Congress amended BAFJA to provide for the current jurisdictional scheme).
However, district courts review de novo bankruptcy court decisions relating to "noncore" matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), (c).
112. The invalidation of judgments and injunctions against creditors offers debtors the
greatest benefit. See 11 U.S.C. § 524.
113. See id. § 362.
114. See Guardian Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Diodati (In re Diodati), 9 B.R. 804, 809
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981). The Book of Deuteronomy documents the "Hebrew Jubilee":
"At the end of every seven years you shall grant a release. And this is the manner of the
release: every creditor shall release what he has lent to his neighbor; he shall not exact it
of his neighbor, his brother, because the Lord's release has been proclaimed." See
Deuteronomy 15:1-2.
115. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523,727. As with each form of bankruptcy relief available under
the Bankruptcy Code, however, § 727 attempts to compromise diametrically opposed
interests. Whereas a discharge from debts is the debtor's "ultimate goal," the law's
predilection to afford financial relief is not "meant to protect the dishonest debtor."
WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 53, at 3-2; see Standard Chartered Bank, P.L.C. v.
Kelpach (In re Bonanza Import & Export, Inc.), 43 B.R. 570, 575 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
A discharge under § 727 is a privilege, not a right. It may be "granted [only to] the honest
debtor." In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793, 794 (2d Cir. 1961); see McManus v. McManus (In
re McManus), 112 B.R. 773, 775 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (noting that bankruptcy is a
"privilege"); Discenza v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 50 B.R. 255, 259 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1985) (noting that a debtor has "no inherent right to a discharge"). This provision
is designed to prevent a dishonest debtor from utilizing the law's protection to shield
wrongdoing. See Chittenden Trust Co. v. Mayo (In re Mayo), 94 B.R. 315,319 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 1988) (stating that § 727 is in place to prevent dishonest debtors from using the fresh
start to the detriment of honest creditors).
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
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debtor's entire discharge can be denied." Objections to discharge of
a particular debt focus primarily on debt created by a debtor's prepetition actions, which caused specific damage to a particular
creditor."8 For example, if a debtor presents a false financial
statement to a lender who relies on the statement in granting credit,119
the individual creditor who granted the credit can object to the
dischargeability of its particular debt. Another example of nondischargeable pre-petition debt is that resulting from pre-petition
embezzlement by an employeeY ° Some debts that are excepted from
discharge are nondischargeable, not because of a debtor's improper
actions toward the creditor, but because of the type of debts involved.
Examples include debts for certain taxes as well as alimony and child
support."
Objections to a general discharge focus primarily (though not
exclusively) on improper conduct during, as opposed to prior to, the
bankruptcy case.22 Examples include false statements made on the
bankruptcy petition or in another aspect of the case, and a failure to
disclose assets in the bankruptcy disclosure documents." Because
full disclosure is considered central to a fair bankruptcy system, 24
failure to disclose relevant facts in a bankruptcy case is considered far
more serious than failing to do so in some context prior to a
bankruptcy case. ' 2 Consequently, a debtor's knowingly false or
incomplete disclosures warrant denial of a his entire discharge, and

117. See id. § 727(a).
118. See id. § 523(a)(2)(B) (excepting from discharge any debt incurred by means of a
materially false and intentionally deceptive statement upon which a creditor relied).
119. See id.
120. See id. § 523(a)(5).
121. See iL § 523(a)(1) (taxes); id. § 523 (a)(5) (alimony and child support).
122. See id. § 727(a).
123. See Ohio Co. v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 162 B.R. 349, 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1993) (stating that failure to disclose transfer of tax refund check to wife and lying about
it at the § 341 hearing justified denial of a discharge); Davis v. Davenport (In re
Davenport), 147 B.R. 172, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that failure to disclose
transfer of over $339,000 to son justified denial of discharge).
124. See Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting the
importance of full disclosure in bankruptcy cases).
125. For example, under the "clean hands" doctrine, release of liability is barred for
misconduct. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 45-47 (1973).
The "clean hands" rationale punishes debtor rnisconduct and protects creditors not on
equal footing with creditors who relied on accurate information concerning the debtor's
credit. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6091 (noting that the fraud exception to discharge protects those creditors who rely on
fraudulent information).
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not mere exception of a particular debt from discharge." Because
most petitions contain some minor errors, and because a truly
knowing false oath could result in a jail term, creditors can extract a
debtor's promise to pay his or her debts merely by threatening to
bring a false oath complaint as a result of these mistakes.
In the following subsections, this Article describes the purpose
of denial of a general discharge for a false oath, as well as the unique
potential for abuse created by the circumstances surrounding these
objections.
In order to determine what sanctions would be
appropriate to impose in the case of unsuccessful objections to a
debtor's general discharge, this Article then analyzes the sanctions
that Congress chose to impose for unsuccessful objections to
discharge of a particular debt.
A. Objections to a Debtor's GeneralDischarge UnderSection 727(a)
Compared to an objection to the dischargeability of a particular
debt, discussed below, objection to a debtor's entire discharge is
serious business."2 This is particularly true of fraud-based objections
instituted under § 727(a)(4), which provides that a debtor who
knowingly and fraudulently makes a materially false statement in or
in connection with her case" will be denied a general discharge. 9
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (providing that a general discharge will be denied if the
debtor makes a knowing and fraudulent false oath or omission).
127. One author has noted that
[i]f an objecting creditor successfully maintains an action under section 523, the
debtor still receives a discharge, however the particular debt owed to the
objecting creditor is excepted from that discharge. In contrast, a successful
action under section 727(a) denies the debtor discharge of all debts. The severity
of a successful action under section 727(a) is clearly more adverse to the debtor
than a successful action undersection 523(a).
Craig A. Barbarosh, Comment, Application of a Heightened Standard of Proof Is Not
Very Clear and Convincing Under11 U.S.C. Section 727(a), 22 PAC. L.J. 1205, 1214 (1991)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). If discharge is denied, the debtor remains liable
for all pre-petition debts that the debtor incurred, thus frustrating the fresh start policy.
See 1 DANIEL R. COWANS ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 5.1 (1989); see also
Chittenden Trust Co. v. Mayo (In re Mayo), 94 B.R. 315, 328-29 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988)
("Compared to the nondischargeability result of a successful § 523(a) attack, a successful
§ 727 proceeding is the equivalent of all out nuclear war on the debtor.").
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4). Materiality generally means that the false statement or
nondisclosure relates to the debtor's case or her business transactions, or concerns
discovery of assets or the disposition or existence of assets. See Mertz v. Rott, 955 F.2d
596,598 (8th Cir. 1992).
129. See Swicegood v. Ginn, 924 F.2d 230, 232 (11th Cir. 1991) ("To justify denial of
discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A), the false oath must be fraudulent and material.");
Palentine Nat'l Bank v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1990)
(requiring materiality in order to deny general discharge on basis of fraud).
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The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the debtor provides
honest and reliable information in her bankruptcy case and that the
bankruptcy trustee has access to all assets and information needed to
administer the estate effectively.' Put another way, the debtor may
not play fast and loose with the bankruptcy process but must describe
fact rather than fiction in her disclosures. 3 ' Disclosure, then, is a
prerequisite to receipt of a bankruptcy discharge.3
Legitimate grounds upon which to object to a debtor's general
discharge include a failure to disclose all property," all income," 4 or
130. See In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1961); Barnett Bank v. Muscatell
(In re Muscatell), 113 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Kriseman v. Ingersoll (In re
Ingersoll), 106 B.R. 287,293 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); Camacho v. Martin (In re Martin),
88 B.R. 319,323 (D. Colo. 1988); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Johnson (In re Johnson),
82 B.R. 801, 805 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988); Butler v. Ingle (In re Ingle), 70 B.R. 979, 983
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987); Schultz v. Shapiro (In re Shapiro), 59 B.R. 844, 849 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Shebel, 54 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985); Discenza v.
MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 50 B.R. 255, 295 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Guardian
Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Diodati (In re Diodati), 9 B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); see
also Wines v. Wines (In re Wines), 114 B.R. 794,797 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that
a "debtor has a paramount duty to consider all questions posed on a statement or
schedule carefully and see that the question is answered completely in all respects"); Giel
v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 58 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) ("[D]ebtor must
provide all of the necessary information."); LaVangie v. Mazzola (In re Mazzola), 4 B.R.
179, 182 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (stating that the "trustee and creditors are entitled to
honest and accurate sign posts on the trail showing what property has passed through the
bankrupt's hands during a period prior to his bankruptcy").
131. See Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1987). The First
Circuit has held that
the very purpose of certain sections of the law, like 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), is
to make certain that those who seek the shelter of the bankruptcy code do not
play fast and loose with their assets or with the reality of their affairs. The
statutes are designed to insure that complete, truthful, and reliable information
is put forward at the outset of the proceedings, so that decisions can be made by
the parties in interest based on fact rather than fiction.... Neither the trustee
nor creditors should be required to engage in a laborious tug-of-war to drag the
simple truth into the glare of daylight. The bankruptcy judge must be deft and
evenhanded in calibrating these scales.
Id. (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Windmiller v. Evans (In re Evans), 106 B.R. 722, 723 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lubin (In re Lubin), 61 B.R. 511, 513 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Ray v. Graham (In re Graham), 111 B.R. 801, 806 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1990) (holding that disclosure is a prerequisite to receiving a bankruptcy discharge).
Moreover, disclosures should be sufficient to make all necessary facts available to those
administering the estate without requiring investigations or examinations to discover the
truth of the information provided. See Ingersoll v. Kriseman (In re Ingersoll), 124 B.R.
116, 122 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
133. See Farouki v. Emirates Bank Int'l Ltd., 14 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1994);
Oldendorf v. Buckman, 173 B.R. 99, 105 (E.D. La. 1994); Scimeca v. Umanoff, 169 B.R.
536, 542 (D.N.J. 1993), affid, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994); Mill Creek Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Stripling, 135 B.R. 133, 135 (N.D. Okla. 1990), affd, 947 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1991).
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all transfers of property of the estate. 35 Discharge also can be denied
for knowingly scheduling non-existent debt to a third party'1 and for
misrepresenting material facts at a hearing or examination in the
case.Y3
While discharge may be denied for just one material
falsehood or omission, courts frequently view falsehoods in a
cumulative fashion." Thus, the existence of more than one knowing
falsehood, which the debtor fails to cure through amendment, will
lead to a denial of a discharge. 39
Regardless of the number of inadvertent errors contained in the
bankruptcy documents, however, the statute does not deny a
discharge because of the debtor's mere inadvertence."' In order to
deny a general discharge, the falsehood or omission must be "known"
to be false.14
Fraudulent intent is required."
Thus neither
carelessness, nor vagueness, nor ambiguity alone creates a cause of
action under § 727(a)(4). 43 Nor does the statute deny a debtor a
discharge based upon the undervaluation of an asset, if the debtor
believed in good faith that the value disclosed on the schedule was
correct at the time the schedules were completed' 44 Finally, a
134. See Dana Fed. Credit Union v. Holt (In re Holt), 190 B.R. 935, 939 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1996); Youngblood v. Hembree (In re Hembree), 186 B.R. 530, 533 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1995); Mosley v. Sims (Inre Sims), 148 B.R. 553,556 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
135. See Ohio Co. v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 162 B.R. 349, 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1993) (stating that the failure to disclose transfer of tax refund check to wife and lying
about it at the § 341 hearing justified denial of a discharge); Davis v. Davenport (In re
Davenport), 147 B.R. 172, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that the failure to disclose
a transfer of over $339,000 to the debtor's son justified denial of discharge).
136. See Aubrey v. Thomas (In re Aubrey), 111 B.R. 268,274 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990).
137. See In re Maynard, 162 B.R. at 349.
138. See Oldendorf,173 B.R. at 105.
139. See id.
140. See Behrman Chiropractic Clinics, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 189 B.R. 985,
993 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that inadvertent error is not false oath).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (1994) (requiring proof that the debtor "knowingly" and
"fraudulently" made the misrepresentation).
142. See id.; see also Garcia v. Coombs (In re Coombs), 193 B.R. 557,565 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1996) (holding that carelessness is not what Congress seeks to punish in § 727(a)(4)).
143. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4); see also Hays v. Cummins (In re Cummins), 166 B.R.
338,361 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1994) (holding that vagueness, carelessness, and ambiguity do
not constitute a knowing falsehood).
144. See Wines v. Wines (In re Wines), 997 F.2d 852, 856 (11th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Sumpter (In re Sumpter), 136 B.R. 690,700 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991). There are
two reasons why undervaluations generally do not constitute knowing misrepresentations.
First, issues of value are thought to be matters of personal opinion, rather than precise
calculations. See In re Sumpter, 136 B.R. at 696. Second, once an asset has been
disclosed, courts reason that the trustee is on notice that the asset exists and can challenge
its value in the context of objections to the debtor's exemptions. See In re Wines, 997
F.2d at 856.

1997]

FEE SHIFTING IN BANKRUPTCY

discharge may not be denied where the debtor merely misunderstood
the words contained in the bankruptcy disclosure documents.14'
These statements are all true for the same reason: without fraudulent
intent, there can be no denial of a discharge under § 727(a)(4).
Moreover, under the statutory language, the knowingly false and
material statement or omission must take place "in or in connection
with the case."'4' A false statement made prior to petition does not
warrant denial of a discharge, yet complaints based on this ground
are filed. 47
One might be tempted to ask at this point, "So what?" People
engage in enough meritless forms of litigation to make the whole
subject rather unremarkableY* More to the point, there are also
many other grounds for objection to a general discharge, 149 and one
could ask why this one is subject to any more abuse than the others.
Here, however, the potential for abuse is unique. This objection is
the only ground from which criminal charges may result."5 A debtor
who violates § 727(a)(4) not only may be denied a discharge, but also
may be subject to imprisonment for committing the bankruptcy crime
of false oath.! The very possibility of imprisonment modifies the
parties' bargaining positions in a way that the other objections to

145. See, e.g., Fahey Banking Co. v. Irey (In re Irey), 172 B.R. 23, 27 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1994) (noting that debtor failed to disclose payment on loan to father because she
did not understand the meaning of the word "insider"); In re Sumpter, 136 B.R. at 699
(noting that wife failed to understand who owned certain assets and had no knowledge of
transfer of other assets jointly owned with her husband).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4).
147. See In re Sumpter, 136 B.R. at 700 (considering case in which creditors tried to
use inconsistent values on pre-petition financial statements to show incorrect values on
schedules, without presenting any proof that schedules were incorrect).
148. That parties take unmeritorious positions in litigation has been seen as anything
but unimportant. The prevailing rule with respect to counsel fees in this country is aptly
named the American rule and provides that each party pay his or her own attorney's fees,
regardless of who prevails in the litigation. See M. Isabel Medina, Comment, Award of
Attorney Fees in Bad FaithBreaches of Contractin Louisiana-An Argument Against the
American Rule, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1173, 1175-76 (1987). Many commentators have argued
that a shift away from the American rule with respect to fees could improve the court
system and provide more equal access to the courts. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv. 792, 794-800
(1966) (arguing that the administration of justice requires awarding attorney's fees to the
prevailing party); Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?,
49 IoWA L. REv. 75, 78-86 (1963) (stating'that attorney's fees awards could alleviate
congestion in the courts).
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
151. See id.
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discharge do not.u2 This possibility, combined with the typical
consumer debtor's inability to afford effective counsel in defending
such suits, provides unequaled incentive for debtors to settle these
suits.
As psychological studies show, individuals who rarely are
involved in litigation are more likely to be risk-averse and
cooperative.'9 Conversely, institutional creditors-with more regular
legal representation, more experience in litigation of a particular
kind, and more ability to afford legal services-are more likely to
present a combative rather than cooperative image in litigation. "
This image may permit creditors to obtain more and higher
settlement opportunities, even in unmeritorious suits. Under these
circumstances, particularly given the threat of imprisonment,
creditors have no reason not to bring claims with very little prospect
of success.
Under the American rule governing attorney fees, each party
pays its own attorney's fees, rather than shifting the fees to the loser
or having them paid from an outside source.'55 In situations in which
152. Naturally, the fear of imprisonment will reduce feelings of well-being and cause
some people to lose self-esteem. Individuals who have low self-esteem are more riskaverse and more likely to settle than those with high self-esteem. See Robert A. Josephs,
Protecting the Self from the Negative Consequences of Risky Decisions, 62 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 26,33 (1992).
153. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 99-100; see also Joel Brockner, Self-Esteem and
Reactions to Negative Feedback
Toward Greater Generalizability, 21 J. RES.
PERSONALITY 318,328 (1987) (reporting on study in which people with lower self-esteem
were found to be more likely to give in to negotiations than those with higher selfesteem); Josephs, supra note 152, at 26-28 (concluding that people with low self-esteem
have trouble facing the threat of a failed decision and thus do what is necessary to avoid
the possibility of regret). People who have been unsuccessful financially have reason to
lack self-esteem and, like personal injury claimants, can be expected to be more riskaverse. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 349 (1991)
(stating that a recent serious loss or injury makes personal injury claimants more riskaverse).
154. See HAZEL G. GENN, HARD BARGAINING OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN
PERSONAL INJURY ACrIONS 25-26 (1987) (discussing the English legal system in the
context of tort suits and using Professor Galanter's analogies to "one shot players" and
"repeat players").
155. The rule's name is derived from its distinct departure from the English rule,
which generally shifts fees to the unsuccessful litigant. See Medina, supra note 148, at
1175-76. The rationale behind the English rule is that vindicated parties should be fully
compensated for all injuries approximately caused by the opposing party's misconduct
and that attorney fees are part of those injuries. See id The rule also recognizes a need
to punish frivolous litigation efforts. See Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, FinancialBarriers
to Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 151
(1981). Reacting adversely to all things English, early American colonists were quick to
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bargaining power is uneven, Congress has made exceptions to the
American rule with respect to attorney fees and has imposed
statutory fees upon a party who institutes unmeritorious litigation or
5 6 Fee shifting statutes,
takes an unsupported position in litigation."
though not without criticism,"' can compensate injured parties,
provide equal access to the courts, and discourage and punish
misconduct in litigation.5' More importantly, fee shifting can
encourage a more economically effective judicial system by inducing
parties to conduct litigation more efficiently."
Statutory fees are not imposed on a creditor who brings an
unsuccessful complaint objecting to a debtor's general discharge,
despite that the very filing of such a complaint effectively denies a
debtor discharge of any of his or her debts until the complaint has
been heard. This constitutes an unfair denial of the fresh start
proscribed by the Bankruptcy Code."6 The debtor in this situation
reject the English rule in favor of the individualistic "folk hero" image reflected in the
American rule. See Medina, supra note 148, at 1175-76. The American rule was thought
to remove impediments to litigation and to place parties on equal footing by making both
bear their own costs. See ld. at 1176. Eventually, the American rule was adopted by the
Supreme Court and became fully entrenched in the American legal system. See id. at
1176-77. The American rule became so entrenched that exceptions to it were recognized
only in order to encourage private prosecution of certain cases or when the inequities of
the rule proved too great. See id.
156. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1109 (1993).
157. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A
CriticalOverview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 653-66 (discussing various justifications for and
criticisms of fee shifting).
158. See Hylton, supra note 156, at 1071 (noting that litigation costs are a significant
obstacle to instituting lawsuits and that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs
discourages the greatest number of lawsuits); Monroe, supra note 155, at 151 (discussing
the need to punish frivolous litigation efforts).
159. See Foreword to Symposium on Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1245,
1253-54 (1993); Hylton, supra note 156, at 1097-99.
160. See In re Burkhart, 91 B.R. 587,589 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988). According to the
Burkhart court, creditors frequently file complaints under § 727 with no legal support
whatsoever. As the court noted:
Such a prayer for relief, even though without any argueable [sic] basis in fact or
law, has the effect of denying debtor a discharge as to any of his debts until such
time as the complaint is amended or adjudicated, and constitutes an unjustified
denial to debtor of a timely "fresh start." Bankruptcy Rule 4004(c) was
designed to insure to debtors this basic concept of bankruptcy policy, and its
purpose is frustrated by these "scatter-gun" complaints.
Creditors and their counsel instituting actions requesting the denial to
debtor of any discharge under § 727, without any legal or factual basis for such
request, should be cognizant of the provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and the
penalties and sanctions which may, and in some instances must, be imposed for
violations of that rule.
Id. However, as discussed in Section VII infra, Rule 9011 does not sufficiently address
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also faces a negotiation that violates the spirit of the fresh start and
that should never occur in the first place. This is a situation that
Congress can and should rectify.
B. Objections to Dischargeof ParticularDebt Under Section
523(a)(2)
Because Congress chose to impose fees against creditors who
bring unsuccessful objections to the discharge of a particular debt,
analyzing the provisions that so provide may help establish a
standard for imposing sanctions under § 727(a)(4). Adding such a
provision to § 727(a)(4) would properly sanction creditors who bring
unsuccessful objections to a debtor's general discharge. Section
523(a)(2), which describes particular debts that are excepted from a
debtor's general discharge, states that pre-petition debts obtained by
false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, as described in
§ 523(a)(2)(A), and pre-petition debts obtained through the use of a
false financial statement as described in § 523(a)(2)(B), are excepted
from discharge.161 Thus, § 523(a)(2)(A) is known as the exception for
debts induced through "actual fraud," and § 523(a)(2)(B) is known as
the exception for debts induced through a false financial statement. 62

this problem. See infra notes 240-68 and accompanying text (discussing application of
Rule 9011 in this context).
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994). Section 523(a) states in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt i2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing (i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive.
Id.
162. Section 523(a) applies only to consumer debts. See idL Thus, a debtor who
successfully defended a nondischargeability action relating to a loan used for stock
market investments, for example, could not collect fees under this section. See, e.g.,
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Burns (In re Bums), 894 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir. 1990); Holmes v.
Bulei, No. 94-15735DAS, 1995 WL 431297, at *10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 20, 1995). A
mortgage, on the other hand, does constitute consumer debt. See Guaranty Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 109 B.R. 698,699 (W.D. Va. 1990).
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1. The Perception of Potential Abuse Under Section 523(a)(2)
The pre-Code Bankruptcy Act provided that if a debtor
obtained pre-petition credit through fraud, or provided a creditor
with a false financial statement upon which the creditor relied in
granting credit to the debtor, a debtor's general discharge would be
denied.'
Evidence presented to Congress at the time the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 was enacted, however, indicated that
creditors were abusing the "false financial statement" exception." 4
Creditors maintained control over the information that was provided
on financial statements, and creditors purportedly informed debtors
that despite language on the financial forms stating that "these are all
of my debts," they need not list all debts." The forms also were too
small to contain a complete list of all debts, making it possible for
creditors to claim later that the forms contained false or incomplete
information."
163. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,

6091.
164. See id.
165. See id. According to the legislative history, it was
a frequent practice for consumer finance companies to take a list from each loan
applicant of other loans or debts that the applicant has outstanding. While the
consumer finance companies use these statements in evaluating the credit risk,
very often the statements are used as a basis for a false financial statement
exception to discharge. The forms that the applicant fills out often have too
little space for a complete list of debts. Frequently, a loan applicant is instructed
by a loan officer to list only a few or only the most important of his debts. Then,
at the bottom of the form, the phrase "I have no other debts" is either printed on
the form, or the applicant is instructed to write the phrase in his own
handwriting. In addition, the form states that the creditor has relied on the
statement in granting the loan.
However, the creditor often has other sources of information, such as
credit bureau reports, to verify the accuracy of the list of debts. Nevertheless, if
the debtor files bankruptcy, creditors with these financial statements are in a
position to threaten the debtor with litigation to determine the dischargeability
of the debt, based on the false financial statement exception to discharge. Most
often, there has been no intent to deceive on the part of the debtor, and, as in so
many aspects of the creditor-debtor relationship, the debtor has simply followed
the creditor's instructions with little understanding of the consequences of his
action.
Id. at 130-31, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6091-92.
166. See id. In my own practice, I became aware that to this day, mortgage bankers
still inform debtors to value their personal property at 30% of the mortgage amount in
order to prove sufficient assets to qualify for the home, even though few debtors have
personal property that is this valuable. If a creditor brought an action on this basis, like
one of the creditors in the hypothetical, it is unlikely that it could prove it actually relied
on this statement, as required by § 523(a)(2)(B). Many debtors do not know the law,
however, and might settle based on the sizable discrepancy in asset valuation between the
pre-petition financial statement and the bankruptcy petition.
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2. The Imposition of Sanctions Under Section 523(d) and the
Section's Underlying Policies
In light of these abuses, some Bankruptcy Code drafters believed
that the entire "false financial statement" exception should be
eliminated; others thought the exception should merely be
tempered.167 Consequently, under § 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978, a creditor could have only its individual debt excepted
from discharge for making a false financial statement, and, even then,
only if the statement was material and was relied upon by the
creditor in its credit decision."' In contrast, a debtor's general
discharge under § 727 cannot be denied as a result of the presentation
of a false financial statement.6 9
To further discourage creditors from using §523(a)(2) in an
abusive fashion, Congress enacted § 523(d), which states that
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of
a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and
such debt is discharged, the court shall grant judgment in
favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable
attorney's fees for the proceeding if the court finds that the
position of the creditor was not substantially justified,
except that the court shall not award such costs and fees if
special circumstances would make the award unjust.

167. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 176, pt. 2, at 136 (1973).
168. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(2), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1994)).
169. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (providing that a debt may be excepted from
discharge if the debtor obtains credit through the presentation of a false financial

statement), with id. § 727 (containing no provision for denial of a general discharge as a
result of presentation of a false financial statement).
170. Id. § 523(d). In contrast, under the Act of 1978, the bankruptcy court was not

expressly authorized to grant fees against a creditor who brought an unsuccessful
dischargeability action. Compare Grove v. Fulwiler (In re Fulwiler), 624 F.2d 908, 910

(9th Cir. 1980) (refusing to grant fees in such an action, pursuant to the American rule,
because the creditor's act was not brought in bad faith or to harass the debtor and
because, under the law applicable to this case, there was no other basis on which to award
such fees), with American Sav. Bank v. Harvey (In re Harvey), 172 B.R. 314,318 (B.A.P.

9th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that fees were now appropriately granted against a creditor
in a losing case, regardless of bad faith, based upon § 523(d)).

It is unclear why Congress chose to sanction abuses under § 523(a)(2) but not under

§ 727. The legislative history indicates that there was more perceived abuse under
§ 523(a)(2) at the time the Bankruptcy Code was proposed. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6321. In addition, abuse under § 727
may be easier to hide from courts and legislatures, given the imbalance of power between
the parties. See supra notes 36,150-54 and accompanying text.
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The section was enacted to dissuade creditors from initiating
complaints based on false financial statement objections in hopes of
obtaining a settlement from an honest debtor who was trying to save
attorney fees. The original version of the section, however, made
no reference to substantial justification and essentially required
1 7 the
unsuccessful
was
suit
creditors'
the
if
sanctions
court to impose
Section 523(d), in both its prior and current form, creates a
presumption in favor of granting such fees in a losing case under
The justification for this divergence from the
§523(a)(2).'
American rule was that unless creditors could be discouraged from
abuse, even creditors with weak cases could use their greater leverage
and resources to obtain payment of their otherwise dischargeable
171. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6321; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Hudgins, 72 B.R. 214,219 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
172. Under the 1978 version of § 523(d), an award of attorney fees to the prevailing
consumer debtor was mandatory absent a finding of clear inequity. See Thorp Credit, Inc.
v. Carmen, 723 F.2d 16, 17-18 (6th Cir. 1983). The Consumer Credit Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, however, enacted a new formula as part of BAFJA. See Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 352 (1984)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 151). The old version of § 523(d) provided that:
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt
under subsection(a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court
shall grant judgment against such creditor and in favor of the debtor for the costs
of, and a reasonable attorney's fees for, the proceeding to determine
dischargeability, unless such granting of judgment would be clearly inequitable.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2592 (1978), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(d)
(1994).
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d). Under the current version of the statute, once the debtor
has won his case, the court is still free to find that the request for nondischargeability was
"not substantially justified" or that awarding attorney fees would be "unjust." 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(d); see also Firstbanks v. Goss (In re Goss), 149 B.R. 460, 462-63 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1992) (noting the effect of the change in statutory language). This was not the case
under the original version of § 523(d), which was more liberal to debtors because it did
not include any reference to justification or special circumstances. See Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 523(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2592 (1978), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(d). The change of
language has increased the court's discretion to deny an award of attorney fees. See
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Burns, 77 B.R. 822, 823 (D. Colo. 1987), affd, 894 F.2d 361 (10th
Cir. 1990); Household Fin. Corp. v. Van Buren (In re Van Buren), 66 B.R. 422, 424
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). Thus, consideration of the specific facts of the case is now
necessary to determine the existence or absence of special circumstances.
Under the present version, however, it is clearly the creditor's burden to show that
special circumstances exist that would make the award unjust, or to show that the relief
requested was substantially justified under the particular facts of the case. See FCC Nat'l
Bank v. Dobbins, 151 B.R. 509,511 (W.D. Mo. 1992); In re Goss, 149 B.R. at 461-62; MidAmerica Credit Union v. Glazier (In re Glazier), No. 90-1256-C, 1991 WL 177698, at *6
(D. Kan. Aug. 26, 1991); Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank v. Weinand (In re Weinand), No. 490-1182, 1991 WL 799, at *3 (Bankr. D. Minn. Jan. 7, 1991); Commercial Credit Plan v.
Carter (In re Carter), 101 B.R. 702, 705 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989); Chrysler First Fin.
Serv. Corp. v. Rhodes (In re Rhodes), 93 B.R. 622,624 (Bankr. S.D. IUI. 1988).
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debts. 4 This abuse would unjustifiably interfere with the debtor's
fresh start.75
Under § 523(d), fees can be shifted only to a creditor, not to the
debtor, after an unsuccessful result.76 Making the imposition of fees
a one-way street also was considered necessary in order to balance
the power between the parties.' If a debtor thought that she might
have to pay a creditor's attorney fees, which could be even more
expensive than her own lawyer's fees, then she would again feel the
need to settle even largely unmeritorious dischargeability actions.17
She could not afford to take a chance. Thus, the legislative history of
the section acknowledges creditors' greater bargaining power in
litigation, in the context of non-dischargeability for fraud. 9
3. Defining the Sanctions Standard Contained in Section 523(d)
While the initial sanctions legislation imposed fees as a matter of
course in unsuccessful actions brought under § 523(a)(2), the current
sanction language is equivocal. According to the section as it now
reads, the court "shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor" for such
fees "if the court finds that the position of the creditors was not
substantially justified," unless "special circumstances would make the
award unjust.....
The legislative history of these amendments to § 523(d) shows a
desire to balance the debtor's right to be free from unreasonable
174. See Citizens Nat'lBank, 77 B.R. at 823 n.t.
175. See IT Fin. Servs. v. Woods (In re Woods), 69 B.R. 999, 1000 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) ("The language and spirit of section 523(d) codifies a policy of discouraging
creditors from objecting to the dischargeability of consumer debts in marginal cases or

where substantial justification [for the relief requested] does not exist."). The threat of
litigation alone is often enough to coerce a debtor to settle or make payment in a reduced

amount when the debt would otherwise simply be discharged. "[D]ebtors are frequently
unable to afford counsel to defend such cases, and, therefore, it is important that debtor's
counsel receive some monetary incentive" to take on such a representation. Id.
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).

177. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 131 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
,6092. Though shifting fees to the debtor upon loss might seem fair at first blush, such a
provision would alter the balance of power in
settle regardless of the merits of their case.
higher than the debtor's fees, creating greater
178. Congress counterbalanced creditors'

favor of the creditor by inducing debtors to
Furthermore, the creditors' fees could be
disincentive to settle. See id.
self-styled advantage by mandating a fee

award to a prevailing debtor, even if the creditor's claim was brought in good faith. See
First Serv. Corp. v. Schlickmann (In re Schlickmann), 7 B.R. 139, 141 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1980). Congress thus intended for § 523(d) to ensure that debtors who have dealt
honestly with creditors receive the fresh start that is at the heart of the Bankruptcy Code.

179. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130-31, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6091-93.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).
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challenges with the creditor's need to raise reasonable challenges."'

The language of the amendment was taken primarily from the Equal
Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"),' which prescribes the statutory
basis on which citizens may receive attorney fees when the federal
government takes an unjustified position in litigation."8
Due to this incorporation of language from the EAJA,
bankruptcy courts have analyzed cases decided under the EAJA to
interpret the meaning of § 523(d).1 4 Much of the analysis has focused
on the leading Supreme Court case on the EAJA, Pierce v.
Underwood." In Pierce, the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development had failed to implement a federally funded subsidy
program that would pay owners of government-subsidized
apartments subsidies to defray rising utility costs and property
taxes." The Secretary was sued by injured homeowners in nine
federal courts, and all of the homeowners ultimately prevailed
against the government.1" Under the EAJA, the homeowners were
entitled to an award for attorney fees unless the government's
181. See OMNIBUS BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENTS Acr OF 1983, S. REP. NO. 98-65, at
9-10 (1983). Congress borrowed language from the Equal Access To Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994), in establishing the fee standard under the revised
§ 523(d):
The Committee, after due consideration, has concluded that amendment of this
provision to incorporate the standard for award of attorney's fees contained in
the Equal Access to Justice Act strikes the appropriate balance between
protecting the debtor from unreasonable challenges to dischargeability of debts
and not deterring creditors from making challenges when it is reasonable to do
SO.
OMNIBUS BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENTS Acr OF 1983, S. REP. No. 98-65, at 9-10 (1983).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994).
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d). Section 523(d) mirrors the language of the EAJA, which
governs claims for attorney fees by litigants against the federal government and which
G
states:
to
a
shall
award
a
court
statute,
by
provided
specifically
Except as otherwise
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in
addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party
in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for
judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
184. See, e.g., In re Hingson, 954 F.2d 428, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1992); Carthage Bank v.
Kirkland, 121 B.R. 496, 499-500 (S.D. Miss. 1990); America First Credit Union v. Shaw
(In re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291,294-95 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
185. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
186. See id. at 555.
187. See id.
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behavior in the suit was substantially justified." The government
argued that its behavior was substantially justified because the
program's implementation language was permissive rather than
mandatory.189 The Court, however, found no support for this
position."
According to the Supreme Court, the phrase
"substantially justified" was added to the EAJA to ensure that the
government's positions were reasonable both in law and fact. 91
Rejecting arguments by homeowners that the test should be more
stringent than mere reasonableness, the Court held that there is
simply no stopping ground between "reasonable" and the far too
stringent standard of "clearly and convincingly justified." '192 In the
face of strong language appearing to mandate that it implement the
program, as well as many adverse rulings against the government at
the time that it opposed this particular suit, the Court ruled in the
homeowners' favor, holding that the government's position was not
substantially justified. 93
Bankruptcy courts have attempted to force the reasoning in
Pierce into the bankruptcy context required by § 523(d), but only
with moderate success. Despite its origins, courts have recognized
that § 523(d) must be interpreted in light of its own legislative history
(or that of its predecessor statute) and read to discourage frivolous
creditor claims."9 Section 523(d) and the EAJA also have very
different purposes. The government is funded through taxpayers,
and courts are not likely to charge taxpayers for another lawyer's fees
unless the government's behavior is more than meritless 95 Thus,
188.
189.
190.
191.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
See Pierce,487 U.S. at 569.
See id. at 570-71.
See id.at 565. After considering endless viable interpretations of the phrase, the

Court'concluded that it meant "justifiable in substance or in the main," as compared to
"justified to a high degree." Id.The Court equated this interpretation with "reasonable
both in law and in fact." Id.

192. Id. at 568; see also Armstead v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. (In re

Armstead), 106 B.R. 405, 413-17 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing Pierce, 487 U.S. at
552, and Brinker v. Guifrida, 798 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Brinker court

enumerated three criteria to establish substantial justification: (1) a reasonable basis in
truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded; and
(3) reasonable support in the facts alleged for the legal theory advanced. See Brinker, 798
F.2d at 664.
193. See Pierce,487 U.S. at 570-71.
194. See H.R. REP.No. 95-595, at 130-31, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6091-

93.
195. See, e.g., Carthage Bank v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 121 B.R. 496, 498 (Bankr.
S.D. Miss. 1990). Moreover, unlike § 523(d), fees are available under the EAJA even if
the government is the defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994) (stating that fees
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what is considered "substantially justified" for the federal
government, a publicly funded and ordinarily understaffed entity,
might be quite different from what is substantially justified for a
private creditor trying to collect a debt after bankruptcy.
Accordingly, it is not at all clear what "substantially justified" means
in the context of § 523(d).
The other factual limitation contained in §523(d), that "special
circumstances" exist that would make the award of fees unjust, is no
more clear. Although this language appeared in the original version
of § 523(d), which was not based on the EAJA at all, courts still look
to the EAJA to ascertain what such circumstances might be.' The
EAJA's legislative history indicates that the purpose of this "safety
valve" in the EAJA is to ensure that "the Government is not
deterred from advancing in good faith the novel but credible
extensions and interpretations of the law.""' This language, however,
gives the court the discretion to deny awards on virtually any basis. 9
Bankruptcy courts have recognized that the substantial justification
standard must be applied in the context of the purpose of § 523(d),
which is to protect debtors from unsavory litigation tactics.'" Thus, a
completely open-ended test, under which any behavior is justified,
would defeat the purpose of the statute.'
Circumstances that have been found not to be special enough to
justify denial of the imposition of fees include that a § 341 hearing20 '
may be imposed against the government under the section in any case "by or against the
United States").
196. See, e.g., In re Kirkland, 121 B.R. at 499.
197. EQUAL AccEss TO JUSTICE Acr, H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 11 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4990. This safety valve was considered necessary to ensure
the government's "vigorous enforcement efforts." Id.

198. See Oguachuba v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.
1983) ("The EAJA thus explicitly directs a court to apply traditional equitable principles
in ruling upon an application for counsel fees ....
"); Abela v. Gustafson, 888 F.2d 1258,
1266 (9th Cir. 1989); Louisiana ex reL Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1224 (5th Cir. 1988).
199. See, e.g., In re Kirkland, 121 B.R. at 500 (stating that the language in § 523(d)
must be tempered by its stated goal of deterring creditors from filing unwarranted
objections to discharge).
200. With a standard as broad as equity, it is hard to establish a meaningful test.
Courts interpreting the EAJA have held that if a claimant undertook affirmative activity
that took advantage of the very government activity he later challenged, then granting
fees would be unjustified. See Taylor v. United States, 815 F.2d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 1987);
Oguachuba,706 F.2d at 99. However, use of this type of test under Bankruptcy Code
§ 523(b) has been unsuccessful. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(b) (1994); In re Kirkland, 121 B.R. at

501 (refusing to uphold a bankruptcy court decision denying fees under the "affirmative
activity" test).
201. A § 341 hearing is a meeting conducted by the bankruptcy trustee, at which
creditors may ask the debtor questions about her assets, her business practices, and her

134
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was too shortm that the debtor resisted appearing at a § 341
hearing,' that the debtor gave vague and evasive answers at a § 341
hearing," and that the debtor took action that was purportedly
disadvantageous, though not fraudulent, toward the creditor.2"'
Neither good faith on the part of the creditor in granting credit nor
an ability of the debtor to pay back the creditor constitutes a special
circumstance.' Finally, a hostile attitude toward the creditor does
not constitute a special circumstance because ultimately it is the
conduct of the creditor, not the debtor, that determines whether
special circumstances are present.'
In sum, § 523(d) mandates the imposition of sanctions whenever
the creditor brings an unsuccessful action, without being substantially
justified, unless the imposition of fees would be unjust based upon
the creditor's behavior. While the section does not mandate the
imposition of fees in every instance, the creditor has the burden of
proving that its behavior falls within one of these safety valves, once
the relief requested in its complaint has been denied. Though
somewhat vague and subjective, the provision presumably serves its
purpose of discouraging frivolous discharge objections in the very
limited context of § 523(a)(2)(A). Thus, this Article will look initially
to this section in attempting to develop a sanctions standard under
§727(a).
C. Comparingthe Fraud-BasedLimitationsand Objections to
Discharge
As the statutory provisions discussed above provide, only a few
of the limitations and objections to discharge are based upon a form
of fraud. Of those that are, one, § 523(a)(2), pertains to pre-petition
fraud in the inducement," while another, § 727(a)(4), pertains to
case. See 11 U.S.C. § 341.
202. See In re Kirkland, 121 B.R. at 501.

203.
204.
205.
206.

See a
See id.
See iUL
at 502.
See id.

207. See i The Kirklandcourt concluded that
the focus of any analysis undertaken pursuant to section 523(d) should be on the
creditor, since the primary purpose of that provision is to act as a deterrent to
unjustifiable creditor conduct. This Court is also persuaded that the application

of equitable principles in a section 523(d) matter must be made with this purpose
in mind.
Ld. at 503-04.
208. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1994) (denying dischargeability of particular prepetition debts induced by actual fraud or through presentation of a false financial
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false statements made in a debtor's bankruptcy papers.'
Commentators typically refer to § 523(a)(2) as "the" fraud exception
to discharge, and most scholarly analyses of limitations on discharge
based on fraud focus on potential abuse under § 523, not § 727.10

Under § 727, however, the standards for denial of a general discharge
are extremely vague, far more so than those applied in § 523(a)(2)
cases.211 Moreover, the stakes for the debtor are far higher in
objections to a general discharge under § 727, making this a fertile
area for creditor abuse. Thus, it is surprising that so little attention
has been paid to this issue.
Perhaps the reason few commentators write about § 727 is that
requests for relief under this section are considered drastic and
thought to be rarely utilized. Reported cases indicate, however, that
§727 is hardly underutilized."3 Given the number of unsuccessful
cases reported, this may be one of the most abused sections of the
Bankruptcy Code.
A creditor who brings an unsuccessful challenge to the
dischargeability of an individual debt under §523(a)(2) may be
charged with the debtor's attorney's fees by statute, while the
creditor bringing an unsuccessful objection to a debtor's general
discharge under § 727(a)(4) cannot. 4 The attorney fees provision in
§ 523(d) applies to both subsections (A) and (B) of § 523(a)(2)-in
other words, to both "actual fraud" and fraud based on false financial
statements,215' even though the legislative history explains inclusion of
statement).
209. See id. § 727(a)(4) (denying discharge of all debts if the debtor knowingly and
fraudulently makes a false statement in or in connection with her case).
210. See, e.g., Barry L. Zaretsky, The Fraud Exception to Discharge Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (1979); Zeigler, supranote 91, at 896-98.
211. To prove fraud under § 727(a)(4)(A), one must prove common-law fraud, which
is an extremely difficult task. See MacLeod v. Arcuri (In re Arcuri), 116 B.R. 873, 880
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
212. There are also a number of ways for a creditor to allege fraud. Moreover, a
debtor may find it difficult to respond to the creditor's allegations, unless those
allegations are very specific. By comparison, since the requirements for proving
§ 523(a)(2) are so specifically delineated, it is far easier for a debtor to respond to
allegations and thus far harder for a creditor to abuse the section. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2).
213. A review of the most recent West's Bankruptcy Digest pocket part indicates that a
great number of cases are brought based on illegitimate grounds. See 16 WEST'S
BANKRUPTCY DIGEST
3283-84 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997). Moreover, these reported
cases do not reflect the number of cases that are settled by debtors before they become
reported cases.
214. See In re Burkhardt, 91 B.R. 587,589 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988).
215. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Bums (In re Bums), 894 F.2d 361,363 (10th Cir. 1990);
Manufacturer's Hanover Bank Trust Co. v. Cordova (In re Cordova), 153 B.R. 352, 357
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this provision in the context of the false financial statement exception
only.21 6 In fact, commentators and legislative history discuss the
imposition of sanctions only in the context of false financial
statements, as if § 523(d) does not apply to actual fraud cases.2 7
Yet § 523(d) is clear on its face. The grant of attorney fees
applies to all § 523(a)(2) cases, including "actual fraud" cases."'
There appears to be no basis at all for imposing statutory fees in a
discharge complaint based upon pre-petition fraud that would not
apply with equal force to complaints based upon allegations of postpetition fraud. Thus, there is no reason not to impose the same, if not
stronger, statutory sanctions in unsuccessful § 727 complaints based
on fraud. In fact, while § 523(d) may well have deterred creditors
from bringing nondischargeability complaints under § 523(a)(2), it
may simply have moved discharge litigation to another battlefield,
specifically to the sphere of § 727.
VI. FORMULATING A SANCTIONS POLICY FOR UNSUCCESSFUL

SECTION 727(A)(4) COMPLAINTS
A creditor who unsuccessfully objects to the discharge of its
particular debt on the basis of fraud must ordinarily pay the debtor's
attorney's fees. " 9 This provision was added to the statute by
Congress to thwart creditor abuses and to balance the power between
potential litigants in this particular circumstance."m In comparison,
there currently is no statutory basis for imposing attorney fees upon a
creditor who brings an unsuccessful complaint to deny a general
discharge based on post-petition fraud."1 The harm caused by a
creditor who unsuccessfully objects to a debtor's general discharge,
however, can be far greater than that caused by a creditor who
objects to the discharge of an individual debt.'
In order to preclude creditors from engaging in leverage
litigation under § 727 solely to force an improper settlement of a prepetition debt, § 727 should be amended to provide for the imposition
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
216. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963,
6090.
217. See, e.g., Zeigler, supra note 91, at 891.
218. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1994).
219. See id.
220. See supra notes 165, 178 and accompanying text (discussing the need to balance
the power between the debtor and creditors who might abuse § 523(a)(2)).
221. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.
222. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of a
successful action under § 727(a)).
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of fee sanctions against creditors who bring unsuccessful complaints
objecting to a debtor's general discharge based on fraud.m
A. Adopting the Same Standardin Section 727 That Is Used in
Section 523
The primary purposes of § 727(a)(4) are to discourage postpetition fraud, to ensure full debtor disclosures to the greatest extent
possible, and to punish failure to comply with these standards. 4
These deterrent goals are not present in § 523(a), which serves
primarily a compensatory purpose. If a creditor is harmed by an
improper disclosure or fraud, it is compensated by having its debts
excepted from discharge." If a debtor is dishonest or incomplete in
his disclosures, then his punishment is denial of his entire bankruptcy
discharge.'
The discharge of the objecting creditor's debt is
secondary and unrelated to the particular fraud.
While
§ 523(a)(2)(A) itself was drafted in a way that would discourage
creditors from using the section at all, § 727(a)(4) serves a function
that is arguably far more critical to bankruptcy policy.' Thus, some
may argue that amending § 727 to provide for the imposition of fees
would discourage creditor complaints that are legitimate and
necessary to ensure honesty in the bankruptcy process. These
differing policies do not, however, alter the need for creditor actions
to be based upon well-founded facts. 9 Concerns about upsetting the
deterrence value of § 727(a)(4) relate to the standard for relief under
223. See infra notes 240-68 and accompanying text (concluding that Bankruptcy Rule
9011 should be used as an interim solution to a § 727 amendment).
224. See Sperling v. Hoflund (In re Hoflund), 163 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1993) (stating that the purpose of §727(a)(4) is not to punish debtors for honest mistakes,
but for intentional attempts to withhold information); Tavormina v. Van Den Heuvel (In
re Van Den Heuvel), 125 B.R. 846, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that "[t]he
purpose of § 727(a)(4)(B) is to prevent fraud"); Aubrey v. Thomas (In re Aubrey), 111
B.R. 268, 274 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the purpose of § 727(a)(4) is to ensure
disclosure of all relevant information).
225. The debtor is repaid for the fees she expended in defending against the creditors'
unsuccessful complaint brought under § 523(a)(2). See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (d). While
the creditor is also punished, the primary goal is to compensate the debtor for the expense
of hiring an attorney. See In re Kingsbury, 146 B.R. 581, 584 n.13 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)
(noting that for a debtor without funds, § 523(d) may provide the only available access to
representation and thus a very important means of compensation).
226. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).

227. See i §727(a)(4).
228. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
229. As courts have noted, lawyers tend to "file first, think later." See In re TCI Ltd.,
769 F.2d 441,442 (7th Cir. 1985) (addressing the need to ensure that a complaint is wellgrounded before it is filed).
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§727, not the punishment imposed for improper litigation.
Whenever a severe imbalance of power exists, more leverage
litigation occurs and harms the party with less leverage.' ° A solution
to the problem is required. The challenge lies in adopting an
appropriate standard for sanctions in deterring abusive creditor
actions without minimizing the statute's deterrent effect upon
debtors. The question, of course, is how best to formulate the
appropriate standard for sanctioning unsuccessful § 727 complaints.
The language of § 523(d) is highly equivocal and combines too many
subjective standards."' Even so, it would be far easier legislatively to
add the same language to § 727 than to propose something new, even
if new language would be superior. If use of the same standard was
all that could be accomplished, that result would be far better than no
change in the statute.
Some might argue, however, that applying the existing test for
imposition of sanctions is easier in the false financial statement
context than in the context of false oaths, which can arise in a huge
variety of contexts and which are more difficult to prove. 2 No
doubt, in false financial statement cases, the standard for denial of
discharge of a debt is fairly objective and legislatively clear.3

230. See, e.g., Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir. 1991)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (discussing leverage litigation in context of a creditor threatening a
debtor with litigation if the debtor fails to reaffirm indebtedness); Chase Manhattan Bank
v. Birkland, 98 B.R. 35, 36 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (same); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Sidore (In re Sidore), 41 B.R. 206, 208 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); In re Hinkle, 9
B.R. 283,285 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (same).
231. See supra notes 180-207 and accompanying text.
232. Objections to a debtor's general discharge, brought under § 727(a)(4), can arise in
many contexts because the alleged false oath can occur in connection with any aspect of
the case. The alleged impropriety can involve a failure to disclose an asset or a transfer of
property on the bankruptcy disclosure documents, see Davis v. Davenport (In re
Davenport), 147 B.R. 172, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992), a failure to disclose certain debts,
see Aubrey v. Thomas (In re Aubrey), 111 B.R. 268,273 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990), lying at a
creditors' meeting, see Ohio Co. v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 162 B.R. 349, 355 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1993), or any other issues arising in or in connection with a case. The false
financial statement exception contained in § 523(a)(2)(B) applies only in very limited
factual circumstances. See supra note 161 (quoting the text of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)).
233. Rather than being triggered by a false oath in the context of any aspect of an
entire case, as § 727(a)(4) is, § 523(a)(2)(B) is extremely specific as to the circumstances
under which a debt will be excepted. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). A debt will not be
excepted from discharge unless a host of particular facts are present, including: (1) the
debtor obtains credit, (2) through the use of a written statement, (3) that is materially
false, (4) that relates to the debtor's financial condition, (5) that is relied upon by the
creditor advancing the credit, and (6) that the debtor made with intent to deceive. See id.
Congress made extremely clear what behavior it was attempting to deter in adopting
§ 523(d). See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
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According to the statute, a creditor must reasonably rely on the false
statement, and the statement must be material in order to
successfully except the debt from discharge.' With a standard of
proof this strict, creditors are unlikely to regularly object on this
basis, even without the sanctions provisions.
As stated above, however, §523(d) applies not only to
complaints based on false financial statements but also to those based
on actual fraud. 5 And, under § 523(a)(2)(B)-the "actual fraud"
basis for objecting to discharge-the standard is as subjective and
open-ended as the § 727 standard. Thus, even if there were a basis
for distinguishing false oath objections from false financial statement
objections, there is no basis for distinguishing between the
subjectivity contained in the false oath standard and that found in
In fact, both of these
§ 523(a)(2)(B) "actual fraud" cases.
impediments to full discharge require proof of actual fraud, the
standard for which is identical in each case.2 The only difference is
that § 523(a)(2)(B) describes the consequences of pre-petition fraud,
which, if proven, would lead to nondischargeability of a particular
debt, and §727(a)(4) describes the consequences of post-petition
fraud, which, if proven, would lead to denial of a debtor's entire
bankruptcy discharge and possibly imprisonment as well. Given the
relative stakes, it makes little sense to sanction only the lesser of the
two evils.
B. Adopting a More ParticularizedStandard
Despite these arguments, there may be legitimate reasons to
apply a more specific sanctions standard to both § 727(a)(4) and
§ 523(a)(2) complaints than that contained in § 523(d). A more
specific standard could provide particular guidance regarding what is
"substantially justified" or what facts constitute "special
circumstances that would make an award unjust," by tying creditor
234. See 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B)(i), (iii).
235. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
236. The need to prove actual fraud is identical in each case, except that the
circumstances under which fraud may be proven is more limited under § 727 because the
fraud must occur "in or in connection with" the bankruptcy case itself. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(4). However, § 523(a)(2)(A) applies to any pre-petition fraud, other than the
presentation of a false financial statement. See id. § 523(a)(2)(A) (refusing to discharge
pre-petition debts to the extent obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud"). Thus, § 523(a)(2)(A) is actually broader and less specific than § 727.
Compare id § 727(a)(4) (punishing any fraud or false statement made in connection with
the bankruptcy case), with id § 523(a)(2)(A) (punishing any pre-petition fraud or false
statement, made in any context, that results in the extension of credit).
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actions to objective criteria. For example, a creditor's actions could
be deemed per se sanctionable if the creditor did not produce
evidence sufficient to reach a trial on the merits. " The imposition of
sanctions based upon this particular standard would be very
beneficial, though not without problems. One benefit of such a
standard is that it would be entirely objective. If a creditor could not
produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment, then fees would be automatically
imposed. There would be no questions about substantial justification
or injustice and no subjective standard to apply. This result would
assist courts in achieving the goal of deterring actions that undermine
the fresh start doctrine.
This standard alone may not successfully deter frivolous actions.
First, some courts may permit unworthy cases to go to trial in order
to avoid the automatic imposition of sanctions. This result would
actually cost deserving debtors more in attorney fees than they pay
now, as more cases would reach trial. A highly objective standard
also may permit too many frivolous cases to go unsanctioned by
limiting sanctions to only a very limited number of cases. Because
some courts let virtually all matters go to trial, this standard actually
may be too limited to deter the vast majority of frivolous actions.
Moreover, some creditors might claim to have pre-trial evidence that
they never produce at trial, thus making a standard this narrow
ineffective in such cases.
One way to address these issues would be to pass an amendment
that not only makes sanctions mandatory if a creditor is unable to
produce evidence sufficient to reach a trial on the merits, but that
also contains a permissive provision that would allow the imposition
of sanctions, even after trial, when the circumstances warrant such an
imposition. The combination of these two tests would reach a
sensible balance between debtor and creditor interests on this issue.
Creditor groups surely will oppose any amendment that discourages
the exercise of their right to object to a debtor's discharge. Yet
debtors have a right to be free from threats that undermine the
237. Some courts have indirectly used the fact that a case never reached trial as
support for imposing fees under Rule 9011 or § 523(d). See In re Hingson, 954 F.2d 428,
429 (7th Cir. 1992); Ciancioso v. Ciancioso (In re Ciancioso), 187 B.R. 438, 442-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1995). Another recognized indicium of a meritorious claim is the willingness
of the debtor to settle. See In re Hingson, 954 F.2d at 429. For the reasons stated in this
Article, the tendency to settle in the context of discharge litigation does not provide

evidence of a meritorious claim. Rather, it reflects the parties' bargaining power and

their ability to handle, assess, and afford risk, both financial and otherwise. See supra

notes 148-54,175 and accompanying text.
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particularly from creditors who have

enormous leverage over them and particularly when the threats can
include threats of imprisonment, a threat far more serious than
nondischargeability of indebtedness.29
VII. APPLYING BANKRUPTCY RULE 9011 PENDING LEGISLATIVE
AMENDMENTS

Bankruptcy Rule 90112"' imposes sanctions in bankruptcy

matters that are similar to those imposed under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24' For the reasons given below, this
238. Cf. American First Credit Union v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291,297 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1990) ("Filing a nondischargeability action sounding in fraud should never be a
routine matter.... To use such a filing to 'shakedown' an honest debtor who is unable to
fund a defense is reprehensible."); Jackson, supra note 35, at 1393 (discussing the
importance of the bankruptcy discharge).
239. Unfortunately for both debtors and creditors, neither § 727(a)(4) nor the cases
interpreting it have established the appropriate standard of proof for § 727(a)(4) cases.
While it is clear from the cases that the creditor must carry the burden of proving that a
knowing and fraudulent false oath has occurred, there currently is no consensus regarding
whether the burden is the more lenient preponderance of evidence standard or the
heightened clear-and-convincing evidence standard. See, e.g., Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d
1527, 1531 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that creditor must prove that denial is warranted
because discharge is at the heart of the "fresh start" and denial is extreme); Barbarosh,
supra note 127, at 1214-15 (noting that no standard has yet been adopted by the Supreme
Court and that lower court opinions reach differing results). This lack of clarity makes it
somewhat more difficult for creditors to determine whether their grounds for objecting to
a debtor's general discharge provide a reasonable basis for relief. Whatever standard the
legislature feels is most appropriate should be added to § 727(a)(4). Most courts
ultimately have held that the standard for denial of a discharge under § 727(a)(4) is the
preponderance-of-evidence standard, see La Brioche, Inc. v. Ishkhanian (In re
Ishkhanian), 210 B.R. 944, 949 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); Craig v. Kaler (In re Craig), 195
B.R. 443,448-49 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996); Dana Fed. Credit Union v. Holt (In re Holt), 190
B.R. 935, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996), rather than the heightened clear-and-convincing
evidence standard, based on somewhat inapplicable language contained in the legislative
history, see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 153 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6340 ("The fourth ground for denial of discharge is the commission of a bankruptcy
crime, though the standard of proof is [still] preponderance of the evidence, rather than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."). All this language really does, however, is clarify that
the criminal standard is inapplicable. Cf. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-91 (1991)
(adopting less stringent standard in a § 523 case and stating in dicta that the standard for
§ 727(a)(4) complaints is set forth in its legislative history). Given the possibility of
imprisonment and the harsh consequences of a successful complaint, the clear-andconvincing test seems more appropriate. See, e.g., First Am. Bank v. Schraw (In re
Schraw), 136 B.R. 301,306 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); MacLeod v. Arcuri (In re Arcuri), 116
B.R. 873, 879 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Mayo (In re Mayo), 94
B.R. 315,325 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988). Such an additional amendment would provide greater
certainty to creditors when deciding whether to bring a complaint under § 727(a)(4).
240. FED R. BANKR. P. 9011.
241. See id. In fact, until recently, Rule 9011 was virtually identical to Federal Rule
11. Rule 11, which sanctions attorneys who bring federal complaints lacking any basis in
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Bankruptcy Rule is no substitute for appropriate legislation that
would curb existing abuses.
While awaiting amendment to
§ 727(a)(4), Rule 9011 can and should be used to sanction creditor
law or fact, provides in relevant part:
(a) SIGNATURE. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if
the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each
paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless
omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the
attention of the attorney or party.
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) SANCTIONS. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the
specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as
provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period
as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately
corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on
the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in
presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances,
a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by
its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision
(b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it
has not violated subvision (b) with respect thereto.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a)-(c). The language in Rule 11(c)(1)(A), requiring that counsel
notify the other side before requesting sanctions, was added to the rule in 1993. See
McCoy v. West, 965 F. Supp. 34,35 (D. Colo. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
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behavior that undermines the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code,
including frivolous or otherwise improper objections to discharge.
Rule 9011 does not, however, satisfy the larger need for corrective
legislation.
There are important procedural and substantive differences
between Rule 9011 and statutorily imposed fees such as those
imposed in § 523(d) and those proposed in this Article. Also, the
effectiveness of Rule 9011 is undermined by judges who refuse to
grant sanctions because doing so is considered too radical.242 Judges
must be willing to impose sanctions whenever they are warranted and
to establish a reputation for punishing frivolous litigation. By doing
so, the fresh start can receive the protection it deserves.
Bankruptcy Rule 9011243 originally tracked Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was adopted to remove any
obstacles, real or perceived, to imposing sanctions in bankruptcy
Unlike Rule 11(c)(2)(A), Rule 9011 binds parties and
court.2'
242. By analogy, two common criticisms of Rule 11 are that it multiplies the
proceeding through side litigation over the alleged violation and that it improperly limits
access to the courts. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We
Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 484-85 (1991) (noting Rule 11's tendency to limit
advocacy in the federal courts in the areas of civil rights, employment discrimination, and
other "disfavored" cases and its tendency. to create satellite litigation); Paul Kaufman,
Note, A Prospective Cap on Rule 11 Sanctions, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1275, 1289 (1991)
(arguing that current Rule 11 has a chilling effect on an attorney's willingness to challenge
existing law and thus proposing limitations on the use of the rule); Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 651
(1987) (arguing that courts resort to Rule 11 too frequently and broadly and thereby limit
access to the courts by certain groups of largely underprivileged litigants). But see A.
Simon Chrein, The Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 15
(1985) (noting with disapproval the unwillingness of lawyers to move for sanctions against
other lawyers, as well as the unwillingness of courts to impose sanctions, despite
misrepresentations of the law, repeated harassing lawsuits, and other clearly sanctionable
actions).
243. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 states in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the attorney
or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney's or party's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation or administration of the case
....
If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court on rotion or on
its own initiative, shall impose on the person who signed it, the represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the document, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(a).
244. See Thomas M. Byrne, Sanctions for Wrongful Bankruptcy Litigation, 62 AM.
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attorneys, both of whom are subject to its penalties if the rule is
violated.245 Rule 9011 is also broader than Rule 11, applying not only
to all pleadings, written motions, and applications, but also to every
document filed or served in a bankruptcy case,246 except the
bankruptcy schedules. 7
Rule 9011's purpose is to discourage pleadings that are frivolous,
legally untenable, or without factual basis, and to deter abuses of the
judicial process.' Subjective good faith provides no protection under
the rule, as the test is one of objective reasonableness.24 9 Specifically,
the rule is violated "where a party or attorney files or serves a
document: (1) not well grounded in fact or not warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal
of existing law, when a reasonable inquiry would have revealed the
deficiency, or (2) for an improper purpose."' m The first prong
BANKR. L.J. 109, 112 (1988). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that
the purpose of Rule 11, upon which Rule 9011 is based, is to "discourage pleadings that
are 'frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even [if] the paper was
not filed in subjective bad faith.'" Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d
Cir. 1986) (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Although an element of compensation exists in the granting of sanctions, the primary
purpose is to deter abuses of the legal system. See Doering v. Union County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988).
245. See Doering, 857 F.2d at 194. Compare FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(a) ("The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification that the attorney or party has
read the document ....
If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court ... shall
impose on the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction ....
"), with FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (stating that every pleading must be signed by
at least one attorney and that the persons who sign the pleading may be sanctioned).
246. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(a) (using the word "document," rather than
"pleading, motions or other paper," when describing the papers upon which one may be
sanctioned).
247. See Byrne, supra note 244, at 113.
248. See CUB Cadet Corp. Inc. v. Rosage (In re Rosage), 189 B.R. 73, 81 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1995).
249. See id. (citing Dura Sys., Inc. v. Rothburg Invs., Ltd., 886 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir.
1989)).
250. Byrne, supra note 244, at 114. An example of a statement that is not "warranted
by existing law" and is lacking in a "good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law" is "that the Debtor's disability income is not income and that
assets in joint accounts with the Debtor's spouse are not assets of the estate" and,
therefore, need not be disclosed on the bankruptcy schedules. Barnett Bank v. Muscatell
(In re Muscatell), 116 B.R. 295,297 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (considering a case in which
"the position taken by [debtor's attorney] was contrary to the most elementary, wellestablished bankruptcy principles, and no competent attorney could argue otherwise, in
light of volumes of court decisions interpreting § 541 ...to the contrary" and noting that
"even minimum research ...would have revealed that this position was completely
without legal support"); see also In re Thomason, 161 B.R. 281, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1993) (referring to statement in pleading "that a lender providing money for the purchase
of goods cannot be the holder of a purchase money security interest unless the lender is
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imposes a duty of reasonable inquiry and is by no means cured by an
once the rule is violated, imposing
honest mistake. ' Moreover,
2
mandatory.
is
sanctions
Given that Rule 9011 is available in any bankruptcy proceeding,
one might wonder why statutory sanctions such as § 523(d) are
needed in connection with § 523(a), § 727(a), or any bankruptcy
provision at all. There are, however, differences in the ways § 523(d)
and Rule 9011 are applied. Section 523(d) arguably contains a more
stringent standard than Rule 9011,2 3 although according to many
courts, the tests are identical.' Yet because of the "unjust" language
of § 523(d), as compared to the mandatory nature of Rule 9011
sanctions, § 523(d) actually appears to be more discretionary.25
The primary difference between the statute and the rule is
procedural. If a debtor proves that a creditor brought an
unsuccessful nondischargeability complaint under § 523(a)(2), in
also the seller of a good").
251. See Byrne, supra note 244, at 113 ("Bankruptcy Rule 9011 ...sweeps away claims
of 'honest mistake' as a complete defense to the imposition of sanctions."). Thus, under
Rule 9011, unlike prior interpretations of Rule 11, a litigant can be sanctioned even if it
did not have an improper purpose. A lawyer can believe that she is diligently pursuing a
valid theory on behalf of a client, and if this belief is contrary to established law, the
behavior is sanctionable. This is necessary to fulfill one of the primary purposes of the
rule-namely, to compensate the party harmed by the frivolous action. See Doering v.
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191,194 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying Rule
11).
252. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 ("If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the
court on motion or on its own initiative shall impose ... an appropriate sanction . ..."
(emphasis added)); Styler v. Tall Oaks Inc. (In re Hatch), 93 B.R. 263, 267-68 (Bankr. D.
Under emerging
Utah 1988) ("There is no discretion on the application of sanctions ....
case law, courts strictly adhere to the mandate of this rule.").
253. Under § 523(d), fees are imposed unless the creditor can prove that substantial
justification exists for its position. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1994). In order for sanctions to
attach, Rule 9011 requires virtually no basis in law or fact, so there can exist a small bit of
justification that would preclude Rule 9011 sanctions, but not be substantial enough to
ward off § 523(d). See Byrne, supra note 244, at 120-21 (arguing that § 523(d) imposes a
stricter liability standard).
254. Because some § 523(d) cases use Rule 9011 to determine what is "substantially
justified," the test may in fact be the same, rather than more stringent. See, e.g.,
Middlefield Baking Co. v. Kassoff (In re Kassoff), 146 B.R. 194, 200-01 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1992) (failing to analyze the difference between the two standards and reaching the
same result under each for similar reasons); cf American First Credit Union v. Shaw (In
re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291, 295 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) (applying a Rule 11 standard to
determine whether § 523(d) required the imposition of sanctions).
255. See Byrne, supra note 244, at 120-21. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (requiring that
fees be imposed if the creditor's acts were not "substantially justified" or if allowing fees
a document is signed
would be "unjust"), with FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (stating that "[i]f
in violation of this rule, the court ... shall impose ... an appropriate sanction" (emphasis
added)).
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relation to a consumer debt, and the debt is discharged, the burden
shifts to the creditor to prove either substantial justification or special
circumstances that would make the fee award unjust. 6 There is no
need for the debtor to bring another lawsuit, or to pay a lawyer to file
more paperwork. Conversely, one must bring a separate motion to
request the imposition of sanctions under Rule 9011."' For many
debtors, this distinction is significant because they may not be able to
bring a separate lawsuit due to cost constraints.
Applying Rule 11-or its bankruptcy counterpart, Rule 9011poses other problems as well. Despite Rule 11's objective standard,
some courts impose sanctions based on the "should have known"
theory, or, in other words, based on the lawyer's experience or lack
thereof. 5 Because the primary problem raised by the frivolous
discharge objection is that it costs debtors money, this tendency is
entirely inappropriate. That a lawyer thought the case was
meritorious, due to ignorance, does not make it any less costly to
defend. Rather, inexperience frequently adds to the costs by
multiplying the proceedings.
Additionally, Rule 9011 is already in existence and does not
seem to be much of a deterrent in cases involving objections or
limitations to discharge2 9 While one author has noted that the
256. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d); Chrysler First Credit Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Rhodes (In re
Rhodes), 93 B.R. 622,624 (Bankr. S.D. III. 1988).
257. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (providing that the court may impose sanctions
only "after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond"), with FED. R. BANKR. P.
9011 (providing that the court may impose sanctions "on motion or on its own initiative").
258. Although inexperience will not technically excuse a lawyer from being sanctioned
under amended Rule 11, as a practical matter, a court may excuse a lawyer who is young
or inexperienced for ineptitude due to this lack of experience. See, e.g., Darling v.
MacPherson, Inc., Nos. 95-35734, 95-35868, 1996 WL 616648, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 23,
1996) (noting that lower court may have properly taken inexperience into account);
Benton v. G & 0 Mfg., 921 F. Supp. 905, 909 (D. Conn. 1995) (limiting the amount of
sanctions charged to an attorney because the attorney's behavior was due to inexperience
rather than intent to harass).
259. Rule 9011 applies to all cases in bankruptcy, yet only two reported decisions have
been found in which the rule has been applied against a creditor in the context of a
frivolous objection to a general discharge under § 727(a)(4). See Summerlin v. Outlaw
(In re Outlaw), 66 B.R. 413, 419 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (considering case in which the
creditor engaged in outrageous, not just unmeritorious, conduct, which included accusing
the debtor of making undisclosed income as a call girl, an allegation the court found to be
entirely unsupported); Chandry v. Usoskin (In re Usoskin), 56 B.R. 805, 813 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985) (considering case in which the creditors had no evidence of any
wrongdoing, except that their debt remained unpaid, and thus seemed to misunderstand
the very concept of discharge). There are, however, a number of cases discussing
application of Rule 9011 in other forms of objections to discharge complaints. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Hudgins, 896 F. Supp. 561, 573 (E.D. Va. 1995); Bielecki v. Nettleton, 183 B.R.
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imposition of sanctions has been on the rise since Rule 9011 was
promulgated, this increase is of no great surprise.2w Under the
Bankruptcy Act, ' bankruptcy courts had very little authority to
impose sanctions and hardly ever did so. 2 Bankruptcy courts still are
reluctant to impose sanctions under Rule 9011 unless the behavior in
question is truly outrageous and not just ignorant.2 Moreover, many
courts seem to associate Rule 9011 sanctions only with improper
bankruptcy filings, imposing them only against debtors and their
attorneys.?4 Some judges may be reluctant to impose sanctions at
all.
Sanctions under § 523(d), however, are another story. They are
imposed fairly routinely, pursuant to the section's specific language,6
and appellate courts regularly overrule Bankruptcy Court decisions
in which no justification is provided for a failure to impose § 523(d)

143, 149 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Gibson v. City of Alexandria, 885 F. Supp. 133, 157 (E.D. Va.
1994); Upadhyay v. Burse, 120 B.R. 833, 837-38 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); Norwood Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guiltinan, 58 B.R. 542,544-45 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); Chaudhry v.
Ksenzowski (In re Ksenzowski), 56 B.R. 819,834 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
260. Until 1983, there was no set procedure under which a bankruptcy court could
impose sanctions. See Byrne, supra note 244, at 109-10.
261. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1994)).
262. See id.
263. See Chrein, supra note 242, at 15.
264. See, e.g., In re Thomason, 161 B.R. 281,284-85 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993) (imposing
sanction against Chapter 7 debtor's counsel); Whitney Apartments Assocs. v. McGlamry
(In re Whitney Place Partners), 123 B.R. 117, 124-25 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (imposing
sanctions against a Chapter 11 debtor partnership); Bank of Mississippi v. McIntyre (In re
McIntyre) 96 B.R. 70, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989) (imposing sanctions against a Chapter
7 debtor); In re Reid, 92 B.R. 21, 25-26 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988) (imposing fees against a
Chapter 12 debtor's counsel). Scholarship on Rule 9011, of which there is very little, also
focuses on improper behavior on the part of the debtor. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 244,
at 116-28 (listing numerous ways in which debtors' attorneys have been sanctioned under
Rule 9011 and very few in which creditors' attorneys have been sanctioned); Note, The
Ethical Role of a Debtor's Attorney in a Consumer Bankruptcy Filing, GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 665, 678-79 (1993) (discussing how to use Rule 9011 against debtor's counsel).
265. See Byrne, supra note 244, at 129 ("[T]he reported decisions do not suggest that
Rule 9011 is being overzealously invoked by bankruptcy courts."); Chrein, supra note 242,
at 15 (noting courts' unwillingness to impose sanctions, even in the face of unethical
behavior). Moreover, while Byrne states that the threat of sanctions is now inescapable
under Rule 9011, see Byrne, supra note 244, at 128, either many inappropriate creditor
actions escape scrutiny under this rule or large numbers of meritorious suits are filed but
for some unexplainable reason are unsuccessful.
266. See, e.g., Firstbanks v. Goss (In re Goss), 149 B.R. 460, 464 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1992); ITT Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Mull (In re Mull), 122 B.R. 763, 766-67 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1992); Morrissey v. Wiencek (In re Wiencek), 58 B.R. 485, 491 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1986).
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sanctions.' Thus, this type of statutory sanction has been at least
somewhat successful in deterring frivolous creditor litigation.
For this reason, some amendment to §727 is needed in order to
keep creditors in line. Shifting the cost of litigation to creditors who
bring an unsuccessful objection to discharge is necessary in order to
protect individual debtors against improper leverage litigation. The
stakes are simply too high, from a litigation cost perspective alone,
and there currently is no incentive for creditors not to bring meritless
objections to discharge2m
VIII. CONCLUSION

The problem created by the current statutory scheme is that
creditors can bring meritless suits in order to pressure debtors to pay
pre-petition claims. As the policies behind § 523(d) establish, 9 as
long as a creditor can withdraw a meritless complaint after being
threatened with sanctions, there is no incentive whatsoever not to
bring one, regardless of its merits. As long as a significant portion of
these complaints generate settlements favorable to creditors and they
are not further deterred, they will continue to be brought. A
disproportionate number of settlements will result because debtors
cannot afford counsel to defend these expensive actions. The threat
of imprisonment for making an honest mistake-though in reality
267. See In re Hingson, 954 F.2d 428, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
bankruptcy court's decision not to award attorney fees could not be based solely on the
fact that a claim of fraud stemmed from a family feud).
268. Suits brought for the purpose of harassment-or, put another way, for the
purpose of extracting a settlement on a pre-petition debt-are one evil against which to

protect; suits brought in ignorance pose another threat. Deadlines come and ill-prepared
attorneys file suits. Once such a case is filed, the debtor should be compensated for
defending it. The motivation for its institution is irrelevant because the goal of such a

statute is compensatory. Thus, as many courts have recognized in the context of existing
§ 523(d), withdrawing the complaint should not relieve the creditor from paying the
debtor's fees. See, e.g., In re Goss, 149 B.R. at 463; In re Mull, 122 B.R. at 766; United

States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Armstead (In re Armstead), 106 B.R. 405, 415
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).

Because the mere filing of a complaint objecting to the

dischargeability of a debt can encourage a debtor to settle a suit, a creditor should not be
able to avoid sanctions under § 523(d) merely by withdrawing the suit. Withdrawal
should merely mitigate the fees and expenses the creditor must pay on behalf of the
debtor.

Recently amended Rule 11, however, now provides that a party can avoid sanctions
by dismissing the action in question and that notice of an intention to request fees under
Rule 11 must be provided. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This amendment provides an
opportunity to withdraw the action before the request for sanctions is made to the court.
See id. If this amendment is similarly adopted in Rule 9011, the section will be of very
little practical assistance in the context of meritless § 727(a)(4) complaints.
269. See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
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slim-will seem great when the creditor makes such a threat, and the
debtor's typically undercompensated attorney can neither ensure a
successful defense nor work for free. Thus, § 727 should be amended
to cure this deficiency.
Rule 9011 alone does not address these problems, and its major
drawbacks in this context already have been noted. A debtor
ordinarily must request affirmative relief against the creditor in
bankruptcy court in order to recover under Rule 9011.0 And, under
current circumstances, the rule is not used to impose sanctions
sufficient to deter the most harmful forms of creditor abuse.
Pending an amendment, however, Rule 9011 should be used to
sanction frivolous creditor action, despite its weaknesses. Debtors'
counsel should be aware of Rule 9011 and should make opposing
counsel aware as well that it applies in all actions in a bankruptcy
case, including those taken by creditors.21
Perhaps the most meaningful action that can be taken, pending
an appropriate amendment, is judicial. Judges can keep their eyes on
particular creditors and watch for institutional abuses. They also can
schedule quick judicial determinations of objections to discharge in
order to avoid delaying the most fundamental protection provided to
individual bankruptcy debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. Finally,
and most importantly, judges can impose sanctions under Rule 9011,
sua sponte, in recognition of the realistic economic situation of many
individual debtors. The bankruptcy rules permit the sua sponte
imposition of sanctions, and a sua sponte ruling is more effective and
less costly than suggesting that debtor's counsel file a sanctions
motion. Thus, while not a perfect solution, Rule 9011 can be used
more effectively by both courts and debtors' counsel in deterring
creditor abuses, pending amendment of § 727.

270. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.

271. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.

